Despite Afghan Opposition’s Optimism Over Michael Waltz, a Trump Administration Is Likely to Take a More Pragmatic Path

Despite Afghan Opposition’s Optimism Over Michael Waltz, a Trump Administration Is Likely to Take a More Pragmatic Path

In recent years, the United States has grappled with the consequences of its foreign interventions, particularly in Afghanistan, a nation long fraught with political instability and warlordism. The Taliban’s resurgence and firm control over Afghanistan underscore a changing geopolitical landscape. Given former President Donald Trump’s outspoken views on disengaging from costly wars, minimizing foreign expenditures, and his general opposition to the neoconservative agenda, it is unlikely that another Trump administration would attempt to resurrect the old order of warlords and fragmented power structures that defined Afghanistan two decades ago.

A Historical Perspective: Costly Wars and the Rise of Warlords

The United States initially became embroiled in Afghanistan with the goal of toppling the Taliban government after 9/11. A key factor in this effort was the support given to the Northern Alliance, a coalition of anti-Taliban factions. The Northern Alliance only succeeded in capturing Kabul in the aftermath of 9/11 due to substantial U.S. airpower, a massive bombardment campaign, and significant financial backing. These resources allowed the Northern Alliance, which had controlled a small territory and commanded a relatively limited number of fighters, to gain a strategic advantage. In stark contrast, Ahmad Massoud—son of the legendary commander Ahmad Shah Massoud—has no comparable territory or forces today.

The warlords of the Northern Alliance, bolstered by billions of dollars in U.S. funds, managed to oust the Taliban but at a significant cost. Many of these warlords, notorious for their corruption, brutality, and exploitation, were rewarded with political influence and wealth. Over time, their governance led to widespread disillusionment among the Afghan populace, creating a power vacuum that the Taliban eventually filled as they regained influence and territory.

Trump’s Record: Opposition to Expensive Foreign Adventures

Donald Trump’s first administration was marked by a clear stance on U.S. foreign policy: avoid prolonged conflicts, reduce unnecessary expenditures, and refrain from nation-building. Trump’s rhetoric was often rooted in a desire to avoid the “endless wars” that had drained American resources and credibility. His 2020 agreement with the Taliban to withdraw U.S. troops from Afghanistan highlighted a shift toward pragmatic disengagement, recognizing the Taliban’s undeniable power and focusing on what he perceived as America’s core strategic interests. This approach aligns with his broader foreign policy philosophy of prioritizing American interests over idealistic but often impractical goals of spreading democracy in hostile regions.

Ahmad Massoud and the Old Opposition: A Fading Influence

In recent years, Ahmad Massoud has attempted to garner international support, meeting with influential U.S. figures, including Representative Michael Waltz, who is reportedly under consideration as a potential National Security Advisor in a future Trump administration. However, the political reality in Afghanistan has dramatically shifted. Massoud and other opposition figures, representing the old Afghan warlords, have no significant foothold in contemporary Afghanistan. Their historical reputation for corruption and ineffectiveness, coupled with the lack of a significant military presence or controlled territory, and ties to Iran makes them an unlikely choice for future U.S. backing, especially given Trump’s inclination to avoid costly foreign entanglements.

The Current Afghan Opposition: A Weak and Corrupt Legacy

The old Afghan opposition—largely made up of warlords and corrupt ineffective technocrats who once wielded significant influence—is politically irrelevant. Their corruption, inability to govern effectively, loyalties and ties with Iran, and decades of infighting have left them with little credibility or support among Afghans. Unlike the early 2000s, when U.S. airpower and financial aid could prop up these figures, the geopolitical realities have changed. The Taliban’s control over Afghanistan is not only more robust but also more organized than it was during the U.S. invasion. A Trump-led administration, known for its aversion to failed political projects and military entanglements, would likely view any effort to bring these figures back into power as a costly, outdated, and futile exercise.

The Pragmatic Path Forward: Engagement with the Taliban

Instead of resurrecting a deeply unpopular, untrustworthy, and ineffective opposition, a Trump administration might choose a pragmatic rapprochement with the Taliban. Such a strategy could serve multiple purposes. By engaging with the Taliban, the U.S. could secure a foothold in a strategically critical region without massive military or financial commitments. Moreover, the Taliban could be a useful counterweight against other regional adversaries, particularly Iran, which has expanded its influence in Afghanistan during and since the U.S. withdrawal. With minimal investment, the U.S. could potentially leverage the Taliban’s established control to counterbalance Iranian influence and address other regional threats.

Realpolitik Over Idealism: A Shift in U.S. Foreign Policy

The traditional approach of backing corrupt warlords in the hope of fostering a stable democracy has failed in Afghanistan. The U.S.’s expensive nation-building efforts have only highlighted the limitations of relying on factions with little popular support and a history of mismanagement. A Trump administration’s potential return to power would likely reinforce a shift away from idealism and toward realpolitik—recognizing the realities on the ground and prioritizing stability over the pursuit of democratic ideals in regions where such efforts have proven counterproductive.

The pragmatic choice, then, would be to acknowledge the Taliban’s control and attempt to engage them as a legitimate power in Afghanistan. Such engagement would not equate to an endorsement of their ideology but would reflect a realistic assessment of U.S. national interests. By minimizing costs and avoiding direct military involvement, the U.S. could maintain influence in the region while avoiding the pitfalls of the past.

Conclusion: A Cost-Effective Strategy in an Uncertain World

Given Trump’s past policies and statements, it is unlikely that he would support an expensive and potentially disastrous attempt to reestablish a coalition of discredited warlords in Afghanistan. While figures like Ahmad Massoud continue to seek international support and maintain connections with U.S. politicians like Michael Waltz, their influence in Afghanistan is negligible. Instead, a strategy of pragmatic engagement with the Taliban—leveraging their control for U.S. strategic interests in the region—aligns more closely with Trump’s foreign policy ethos. In a world of shifting alliances and evolving threats, a new Trump administration would likely favor cost-effective measures that prioritize stability and security over ideological missions, reflecting a hard-nosed realism that has long been absent from U.S. policy in Afghanistan.

This approach may not be without controversy, but it acknowledges a truth that many policymakers have been reluctant to accept: the era of American-backed nation-building in Afghanistan is over, and it is time to adapt to the new reality.

How a Trump Administration Could Forge a Working Relationship with the Taliban Government in Afghanistan