Challenges Facing Damascus Government Regarding Druze, Alawites, and Kurds

The peaceful transition of power in Syria—marked by Bashar al-Assad’s departure and the subsequent assumption of power by Ahmad al-Sharaa—was indeed a rare event in the region’s history. However, the path ahead for the new government is neither smooth nor simple. While the majority in Syria and the international community desired real change, the process of uprooting the Assad regime was long, bloody, and complex.

The current developments must be understood not as a moment of victory but as part of a broader, turbulent transition. Despite widespread optimism, political tensions have already emerged, including clashes with Alawites in the coastal region, attacks on Christian churches in Damascus, disputes with Druze in Suwayda, and tensions with the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) in Raqqa.

Key Challenges

1. Sectarian and Ethnic Divisions

• Alawites:

  • Having been the backbone of Assad’s rule, Alawites may fear marginalization or reprisals in a post-Assad Syria.

  • Any attempt to dismantle their dominance in security and military institutions could trigger armed resistance.

  • The new government must integrate them without replicating the “minority rule” model of the past.

• Druze in Suwayda:

  • The Druze have maintained a cautious stance during the war, sometimes aligning with the regime and at other times with the opposition.

  • Their distrust of Damascus could lead to demands for greater autonomy or alliances with external actors (Jordan, Israel).

  • Any heavy-handed security measures in Druze-majority areas could provoke unrest.

• Kurds & the SDF:

  • Syrian Kurds, particularly those under the SDF, seek autonomy or federalism. Damascus’ attempts to reassert control could reignite conflict.

  • Turkey’s hostility toward Kurdish self-rule adds another layer of complexity, as Ankara may intervene militarily if Kurdish autonomy expands.

2. Security Threats & Foreign Interference

• Remnants of the Assad Regime & Iranian-Backed Forces:

  • Loyalist militias and Iranian proxies (e.g., Fatemiyoun Brigade) may resort to sabotage or insurgency to destabilize the new government.

  • Iran could use its influence to turn Syria into a battleground for its regional interests.

• Jihadist Groups:

  • Residual ISIS and Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) elements in Idlib could exploit sectarian tensions to regroup.

3. Economic & Social Crisis

• Collapsed Economy & Reconstruction:

  • Hyperinflation, unemployment, and destroyed infrastructure require urgent attention.

  • International aid remains slow due to political conditions, leaving millions in poverty.

• Social Reconciliation:

  • A deeply polarized society needs a credible national reconciliation process.

  • Without fair power-sharing and resource distribution, renewed conflict is likely.

Potential Solutions

• Inclusive Governance:

  • A coalition government incorporating Alawites, Druze, and Kurds to prevent exclusion.

  • Decentralization or federalism to address Kurdish demands while preserving Syria’s unity.

• Security Reforms:

  • Rebuilding the military and intelligence apparatus to ensure they represent all Syrians, not just one sect.

  • Negotiations with the SDF for a semi-autonomous Kurdish region (similar to Iraqi Kurdistan).

• Economic Recovery:

  • Lifting sanctions in exchange for political reforms.

  • Prioritizing job creation in marginalized areas (e.g., Alawite coast, Suwayda).

Conclusion

The new Syrian government faces a delicate balancing act: ensuring security while accommodating sectarian and ethnic demands, rebuilding a shattered economy, and navigating foreign interference. If Ahmad al-Sharaa fails to win the trust of Alawites, Druze, and Kurds, Syria risks further fragmentation or a return to violence. Success hinges on transforming Syria from a state of forced coexistence under Assad into a voluntary partnership in a new political order.

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