Should We Confront Iran or Not?

For the past half-century—especially in recent decades—most Afghan politicians have taken unstable and contradictory positions in their foreign relations, particularly with neighboring countries. These fragile positions were often based on covert intelligence dealings and personal gains in exchange for trivial benefits, which has contributed to Afghanistan’s ongoing failures over many years.

One key flaw in these policies has been the failure to clearly define and distinguish strategic friends and enemies in regional and international relations. A policy of neutrality—or more accurately, a policy of helplessness—has brought about severe problems. Over the last fifty years, Afghans have paid a heavy financial and human price and the country continues to drift in an uncertain direction.

A fundamental question must be asked: Is Iran or Pakistan a strategic friend of Afghanistan?
If not, then why shouldn’t we confront them, especially when, over the years—before the republic, during the republic, and after its fall—Iranian regimes have played an even greater role than Pakistan in destabilizing Afghanistan?

Why do former and current Afghan politicians—those who claim to be political leaders—continue to prioritize personal benefits like small operational funds, under-the-table payments, family visas, or immigration favors, while ignoring Afghanistan’s national interests and instead defending the interests of Iran and Pakistan?

Here, I will briefly discuss Iran and how it has harmed Afghanistan’s national interests in recent years:

• Iran actively discouraged the leadership of the 20-year Republic and the former jihadist factions from forming a strategic partnership with the United States. Iran understood that if the Afghan republic became strong and had a partner like the U.S., Iranian and Pakistani interests would be threatened.
• Afghan politicians, seeking favor with Iran and Pakistan, pursued hostile policies toward the U.S. — policies that ultimately led to the destruction of Afghanistan.

In June 2002, when Marshal Mohammad Qasim Fahim visited Iran and met with senior Iranian officials—including IRGC Commander General Yahya Rahim Safavi, Defense Minister Ali Shamkhani—he portrayed the situation as though the U.S. was planning to remove President Karzai from power and replace him.
President Karzai, always suspicious and prone to conspiracy theories, internalized this and began accusing anyone who challenged his authority of being a U.S. loyalist. At one point, he even accused all governors of collaborating with foreigners in a national governors’ meeting.

Iran constantly sought strategic relations with Afghan security institutions.
When I served as First Deputy and Acting Minister of Defense in 2020, Iran again pushed for anti-American strategic ties with Afghanistan.

During President Karzai’s era, Iran sent suitcases of cash to the Presidential Palace—an act later exposed and weakly justified. Through this financial influence, Iran gained leverage in the Presidential Palace and the National Security Council.
Iranian leaders then used the Afghan presidency as a platform to voice anti-American rhetoric, which the U.S. did not ignore. Once a country like Iran gains influence in a president’s office and national security council, it can extend that influence to all levels of government.

Former jihadi leaders and factions have consistently served Iranian interests—at the expense of Afghanistan—and this pattern continues to this day.

Iran recruited Afghan refugees into the Fatemiyoun militia, sending them to fight in Syria and Iraq for minimal wages, solely for Iran’s interests.

Key Taliban leaders also resided in Iran. Mullah Mansoor traveled frequently to Iran and was eventually killed in Balochistan. Even remnants of al-Qaeda have been found in Iran.

While I served as Governor of Nangarhar, all foreign ISIS fighters arrested in the province had entered Afghanistan through Iran.
When I later met with Iran’s Deputy Chief of Staff, I raised this issue with him directly.

Iran smuggled billions of dollars through Aryana Bank, which was eventually shut down due to this abuse.
It also used its consulates to promote sectarian and ethnic divisions, and obstructed the construction of major dams like Salma and Bakhshabad—just a few examples among many.

So why is it considered “provocative” when Afghans speak up to defend their rights against Iranian oppression?

The Iran–Israel or Iran–U.S. conflicts are not religious wars, but rather national interest-driven rivalries. In international relations, interests matter more than shared language, ethnicity, or culture.
If common culture or religion mattered so much, then why did Iran fight a bloody war with Iraq for years, even though Iraq was not an ally of the U.S.?

Iran is currently playing a double game, much like Pakistan. It maintains good ties with the Taliban while also supporting their opponents, funding their offices and covering their living expenses.
Therefore, Iran’s policy toward Afghanistan is not honest—it is purely based on its own interests.

Afghans too must prioritize their own national interests, not those of Iran or any other foreign country.

Thus, Afghans have every right to condemn Iranian oppression and interference in Afghanistan.
This is not hostility—it is a rightful defense of Afghan sovereignty and national interests.

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