Hezbollah faces two bitter choices: The cost of retaining its weapons is exorbitant—for itself and for Lebanon—while relinquishing them would amount to political suicide, stripping the party of its identity and the very purpose for which it was founded. Meanwhile, betting on “the factor of time” or seeking an exit appears to hinge on the unknown.
In Lebanon, a political and popular majority has emerged in light of the outcomes of the “Wars of Support” (Syrian Civil War) and “The Strong Ones” (2006 war with Israel). This majority now views Hezbollah’s arms as having lost their ability to protect, deter, or liberate in the face of Israel—the three functions that originally justified the party’s four-decade monopoly over weapons, their stockpiling, development, and use.
Today, Hezbollah struggles to market these functions to a growing segment of Lebanese, particularly outside its core Shiite support base. A Christian, Sunni, and Druze majority—along with a Shiite minority—now backs the state’s bold new approach to addressing the issues of “weapons exclusivity” (state monopoly on arms) and “the decision of war and peace.”
Even among Shiites themselves, a significant faction that supports Hezbollah’s retention of arms does so based on domestic considerations—legitimate or otherwise—fearing for the future of their sect and its standing, or wary of the repercussions of Syria’s collapse on Lebanon’s power dynamics since the fall of the Assad regime on December 8. In this sense, this faction no longer ties the weapons to resisting Israel or liberating remaining southern territories but rather to internal Lebanese and Syrian dynamics.
Undoubtedly, another faction of Lebanese has never approved of Hezbollah or its arms. This group once took up arms against the Palestinian resistance and the Lebanese national movement and did not hesitate to call for Israeli intervention to settle internal battles. Today, this faction remains loyal to its stance, now more emboldened in confronting Hezbollah’s weapons, inciting against them, and seeking external backing to overpower the party.
And today, the “external” factor is no longer just Israel. The U.S. is leading an intense campaign to strangle Hezbollah’s arms and fighters, cutting off its supply lines, draining its financial and economic resources, and rallying the state, institutions, parties, and local allies against it—pushing aggressively to accomplish this mission without hesitation.
Among its tactics is waving the “Greater Syria” card, effectively handing Lebanon over to Syria, as hinted by U.S. envoy Tom Barak—a critic of Sykes-Picot and an advocate for redrawing the region’s maps along sectarian, ethnic, and religious lines, while subtly endorsing Gideon Sa’ar’s theory of a “Minorities Alliance.” The recent Hasaka conference was a practical step in this direction, backed by France and a U.S. green light, confronting Syria’s new regime and, beyond it, Ankara and its Syrian allies.
This growing Lebanese faction senses a “historic opportunity” to close a file left open for over four decades, under the banner of building a strong, just state that guarantees security for all. It is as if this group is racing against time before the “opportunity” loses momentum.
Hezbollah’s Gambles
Yet, this faction’s task is far from easy. Israel has not adhered to the November 27 agreement to halt its repeated aggression against Lebanon, nor has the U.S. offered convincing guarantees that post-disarmament Lebanon would regain its land, prisoners, peace, stability, and prosperity. Even the most ardent advocates of disarmament now express their stance in terms of probabilities rather than certainties—prompting Hezbollah and its supporters to warn against a “leap into the unknown.”
Another factor influencing the arms issue is the “Syrian variable.” Hezbollah may be betting on Syria’s unfolding developments—the emergence of a “Druze question” alongside the “Kurdish question,” and perhaps later an “Alawite question”—to shift Lebanese state and public opinion on its weapons. However, images of sectarian clashes and “crimes” from Syria do little to reassure Lebanon’s diverse communities about their future, including groups with no love for Hezbollah.
Worse still, Hezbollah’s worst gamble would be assuming Israel is war-weary and reluctant to return—whether due to military exhaustion, Gaza’s front, or the belief that its fate will be decided in U.S.-Iran negotiations.
But Israel will not stop targeting Lebanon—especially as it sees its war there as cost-free. Nor will Iran prioritize Hezbollah’s arms over its own national security if serious talks with the West begin.
A Clash Unlikely
Many Lebanese fear the state-Hezbollah dispute could escalate into a clash between Hezbollah and the army. However, neither side has the desire, will, or interest in such a confrontation, which most Lebanese reject and only a minority incites.
Such a clash would not only isolate Hezbollah within its national and sectarian base but could also threaten the army’s unity, potentially reigniting civil war scenarios where the military splintered along sectarian lines.
Ruling out an army-Hezbollah clash does not mean Lebanon will avoid another war—this time between Israel and Hezbollah. If Hezbollah refuses to surrender its arms, Israel will justify “treacherous” strikes on its positions, possibly resuming high-profile assassinations. And if Hezbollah retaliates, Israel may replicate its Gaza scenario in Lebanon.
Most assessments suggest Hezbollah is not in a military position to restore “deterrence balance” or impose new rules of engagement—especially amid dwindling Lebanese, Arab, and international cover and the weakening of the once “Axis of Resistance.”
What Disarmament Would Mean for Hezbollah
Surrendering its arms to the army and transitioning fully to local politics would strip Hezbollah of its uniqueness, reducing it to just another party—not necessarily the strongest in the street, parliament, or government. It would also open a chapter of scrutiny and accountability, unlikely to favor Hezbollah, given the thousands of martyrs and wounded who sacrificed for the resistance only to end up reliant on aid boxes.
An unarmed Hezbollah would no longer dominate even the Shiite community, potentially fracturing Shiite representation beyond the current duopoly. Worse yet, Israel would not leave Hezbollah alone—even if it disarmed. The far-right Israeli government would continue asserting its security control over Lebanon, humiliating Hezbollah at every turn, settling scores with those who spilled Israeli blood, and treating Lebanon as a “vital sphere” in its national security doctrine.
Based on past experience, Israel would bully and demand further submission the weaker it perceives its adversary—especially if Hezbollah steps back from confrontation.
Leaving the Task to Israel
Given this dual deadlock—state and Hezbollah at an impasse—the most likely scenario is leaving the task to Israel. Not through an explicit conspiracy but via an “objective division” of roles: the Israeli Air Force launching devastating strikes on Hezbollah and its social strongholds in the south, Dahieh, and the Bekaa, while Mossad expands assassinations beyond military figures.
Only then, with Hezbollah weakened, could local discussions on disarmament resume under different circumstances—or so some bet, at the very least.
For Lebanon, there are no easy choices. The state is besieged by unprecedented pressure from Arab, European, and American allies, all under the banner of “weapons exclusivity.” Meanwhile, reconstruction, recovery, and escaping sanctions hinge on swift progress on this front.
Yet, using force to disarm Hezbollah is a “recipe for ruin,” risking civil war anew—a nightmare Lebanon’s wise seek to avoid.
Thus, in this gridlock, the most probable outcome is outsourcing the task to Israel—not by design, but by default.
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