Between Deterrence and Diplomacy: Iran’s Internal Debate over Regime Survival and the Ukrainian Precedent

Hardliners in Tehran argue that Iran’s adversaries are less concerned with its nuclear program than with its geopolitical position as a regional power in the Middle East.

The current domestic debate in Iran reflects two competing imperatives. On the one hand, reformist calls for change are primarily driven by the desire to preserve the survival of the Islamic Republic, avert the activation of the “snapback mechanism,” and prevent escalation with Israel or further deterioration in relations with Europe and Washington. Hardliners, on the other hand, contend that Iran was attacked only two days before the sixth round of negotiations and insist that no guarantees of national security exist apart from strengthening deterrence capabilities and raising the cost of any aggression. In their view, “there is no diplomacy without the battlefield.”

Although Iranian politics is often framed through the dichotomy of “hardliners” versus “reformists” (and sometimes “moderates”), this binary masks the deeper reality: beneath the apparent diversity of views, a set of ideological constants underpins the Islamic Republic. While the regime has permitted variation in domestic and foreign policy approaches, particularly regarding women’s rights, civil liberties, foreign investment, openness to the West, and relations with Washington, these divergences have often been instrumentalized depending on the level of tension with the West. What distinguishes the present debate, however, is its intensity and the existential stakes attached to it.

Against the backdrop of U.S. and Israeli threats of potential military strikes, coupled with European warnings to trigger the snapback mechanism should Iran fail to allow IAEA inspectors by the end of August, the reformist “Front of Reform” issued a statement urging voluntary suspension of enrichment and comprehensive monitoring by the IAEA. The appeal emphasized the need for urgent adjustments to ensure the security and survival of both Iran and the regime.

Hardliners immediately rejected these appeals, accusing reformists—along with former Foreign Minister Javad Zarif and ex-President Hassan Rouhani—of serving American demands and failing to grasp the essence of Iranian deterrence. They argued that past “reformist” governments, which promised prosperity through sanctions relief, offered little more than submission to Washington and Tel Aviv. For hardliners, Libya and Ukraine stand as cautionary tales: Libya surrendered its nuclear and chemical arsenals only to face NATO intervention, while Ukraine relinquished the world’s third-largest nuclear stockpile in exchange for security guarantees, yet later became a victim of war and territorial fragmentation.

In contrast, Zarif’s writings in Foreign Policy outlined a bold diplomatic vision, advocating a transformative shift from a threat-based posture toward one of regional cooperation—expanding ties with neighbors, engaging the Global South, renewing dialogue with Europe and the United States, and building a new West Asian partnership. Hardliners denounced this as self-blame, accusing Zarif of attributing Iran’s challenges to domestic policies and paving the way for eventual negotiations with Washington.

At the heart of the dispute lies a fundamental question: are Iran’s challenges with the West primarily rooted in its nuclear and missile programs, its support for the “Axis of Resistance,” and its regional interventions—as reformists suggest—or, as hardliners insist, in its geopolitical location, energy resources, and cultural influence in the Middle East? Reformists argue their approach serves the national interest, safeguarding Iran’s future and the Islamic Republic’s survival. Hardliners counter that such positions fracture national unity and liken reformists to “local Zelenskys,” warning that prioritizing internal reform mirrors Ukraine’s path of dependency and vulnerability.

This internal conflict thus reveals two competing visions for Iran’s future. The reformist camp frames its demands as a means to protect the regime from external threats and international isolation. The hardliners, however, maintain that only military deterrence ensures Iran’s survival and that concessions merely invite aggression. The debate has intensified in the wake of October 7, 2023, after Israel’s strategic blows to Iran and its regional allies, followed by U.S.-Israeli strikes. This raises critical questions: Will Tehran alter the regional strategy it has pursued for decades, particularly as Israeli policy reshapes regional dynamics? Does Iran still possess opportunities to revive its regional ambitions? Can it rebuild its network of proxies, or will structural shifts force a strategic recalibration? Are reformist proposals for change from within a genuine recognition of external threats—or an opening for the West to pursue regime change under the guise of reform?

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