Three Possible Moves by Iran

On August 8, 2025, the Peace and Relations Agreement between Azerbaijan and Armenia was signed in the presence of U.S. President Donald Trump, Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev, and Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan.

The agreement marks a significant development with potential structural impacts on the economy, strategy, and security of the South Caucasus. It includes provisions for bilateral cooperation in areas such as transport and transit, and carries implications for Russia’s influence in the Caucasus as well as China’s Belt and Road Initiative linking Beijing to Europe.

The accord may also have strategic consequences for Iran, particularly regarding the security of its northwestern borders, its Eurasian connections, and its role as a regional power.

Iran’s Historical Stance on the Zangezur Corridor

For years, Iran opposed the implementation of the Zangezur Corridor, initially describing it as the “Turan Corridor,” and later warning that it could pave the way for U.S. and NATO involvement in the region.

From Tehran’s perspective, the corridor links Turkey to Turkic-speaking Central Asian republics and represents a step toward geopolitical integration of the Turkic world under pan-Turanist ideology. The term Turan itself is derived from Tur/Türk combined with the suffix -an, denoting “land of the Turks.”

Within Iran, the corridor has long been a contentious domestic issue. Hardline conservatives frequently accused academics, analysts, and journalists supportive of the project of being “Turanians” and worked to sideline them.

Iran also rejected Turkey’s proposal for a regional solution involving Armenia, Azerbaijan, Turkey, and Iran, as well as Russia’s initiatives following the Second Karabakh War, which had increased Moscow’s influence in the South Caucasus. This obstructionist policy forced regional states to explore alternative approaches.

Several developments have since weakened Iran’s influence in the region: its opposition to Baku during the Second Karabakh War (which Azerbaijan won), its brief 12-day conflict with Israel, the weakening of its regional allies, Armenia’s political realignment, and the diminishing role of Russia in the Caucasus due to the war in Ukraine.

Iran’s Reaction to the Agreement

Following the U.S.-brokered signing, Iranian officials issued mixed and often contradictory statements, reflecting the absence of a unified national policy.

Government officials adopted a more measured tone compared to past rhetoric, with the Foreign Ministry cautiously welcoming the agreement as potentially contributing to peace, while warning that a permanent foreign military or political presence in the South Caucasus would obstruct regional stability.

Government spokesperson Fatemeh Mohajerani argued that Iranian concerns had been considered in the agreement, adding: “It is, of course, better for the region’s inhabitants themselves to guarantee security.” She rejected claims that Tehran’s reformist administration had been passive, emphasizing that the Zangezur Corridor represented only a small fraction of Iran’s northern border and that public debate on social media was exaggerating the issue.

By contrast, military leaders and senior political figures adopted a far harsher stance. Ali Akbar Velayati, chief foreign policy adviser to Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei, declared that Zangezur would be a “graveyard for America,” and vowed that Iran would obstruct the corridor with or without Russia’s support. Similarly, IRGC political deputy Yadollah Javani accused Aliyev and Pashinyan of inviting the U.S., U.K., and NATO into the region, framing it as a direct threat not only to Iran and Russia but also to China and India.

Some hardliners, such as Hossein Shariatmadari, editor-in-chief of Kayhan, went so far as to suggest closing the Strait of Hormuz in response.

President Masoud Pezeshkian, however, struck a more cautious note, insisting that Iran had secured guarantees that the corridor would remain under Armenian sovereignty and that Iran’s land connection to Europe would not be disrupted. He identified only the potential involvement of an American company in the corridor’s construction and operation as a “worrying element.”

Iran’s Secretary of the Supreme National Security Council, Ali Larijani, also downplayed the threat, explaining that the corridor would not endanger Iran so long as it did not cause “geopolitical asphyxiation”—which he defined as the severing of Iran’s land link to Armenia.

Pezeshkian’s Visit to Yerevan

On August 19, 2025, just eleven days after the signing, President Pezeshkian visited Armenia and met with Prime Minister Pashinyan. The two leaders discussed the agreement, the Zangezur Corridor, and wider bilateral cooperation, signing ten memorandums of understanding.

One of the most significant outcomes was the decision to build a second bridge over the Aras River. Iran had previously promoted the idea of an Aras Corridor as an alternative to Zangezur. The leaders also agreed to pursue the Nakhchivan–Julfa rail connection, which would allow Iran access to Armenia and the Black Sea via rail networks.

In joint statements, Armenian leaders reassured Tehran that all transit routes through Armenia would remain under full Armenian sovereignty. While Iranian officials expressed satisfaction, their approval appeared cautious. The military establishment, in particular, continues to view Zangezur as a security threat.

Iran’s Likely Next Steps

Iran’s concerns over the corridor are twofold:

• Traditional concerns: the fear that it could cement a direct land link between Turkey and Azerbaijan, forming the backbone of a wider pan-Turkic geopolitical bloc.

• New concerns: the belief that the corridor could enable U.S. and NATO influence in the region, undermining Iran’s national security.

Given deteriorating Iran–Azerbaijan relations, Tehran’s options are narrowing. It is unlikely to open a new front in the north while grappling with domestic challenges, regional pressures, and the possibility of renewed conflict with Israel.

Iran’s possible courses of action can be summarized as follows:

1. Engagement over obstruction: Tehran could abandon its blocking policy and instead participate in the project, framing the proposed Aras Corridor as a southern extension of Zangezur that would give Iran a role in regional transit.

2. Alignment with China: If Beijing views Zangezur as a threat to its Belt and Road Initiative, Iran may find common ground with China to obstruct the project. This partnership could provide Tehran with new leverage.

3. Alternative corridors with Russia and China: Iran may seek trilateral cooperation with Moscow and Beijing to develop routes outside U.S. influence. However, Tehran remains wary of a potential U.S.–Russia understanding, particularly after the Trump–Putin summit in Alaska, and Russia’s war in Ukraine could limit Moscow’s engagement.

Although Iran retains the capacity to destabilize the South Caucasus through proxy actors, its current domestic and regional difficulties may lead it to avoid direct confrontation.

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