“This is a time for us to engage America, manage China, cultivate Europe, reassure Russia, bring Japan into play, draw neighbours in, extend the neighbourhood and ex-pand traditional constituencies of support,” Indian Foreign Minister S. Jaishankar wrote in his 2020 book The India Way: Strategies for an Uncertain World.
For over a decade, India has positioned itself as a key player in a multipolar world: one foot in Washington, another in Moscow, and a wary eye on Beijing. But that balancing act is under strain.
Donald Trump’s administration has shifted from cheerleader to critic, accusing India of financing Moscow’s war effort through discounted oil purchases. Delhi now faces public rebuke and higher tariffs. Against this backdrop, Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s upcoming meeting with Xi Jinping in Beijing looks less like triumphal diplomacy and more like pragmatic rapprochement.
India straddles two blocs: it is a pillar of the Indo-Pacific Quad alongside Japan, the US, and Australia, while also a member of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), a China- and Russia-led bloc often at odds with US interests. Delhi buys discounted Russian oil even as it courts American investment and prepares to attend the SCO summit in Tianjin next week.
There are also initiatives like I2U2—a collaboration between India, Israel, the UAE, and the US focused on technology, food security, and infrastructure—and trilateral projects with France and the UAE. Analysts argue this strategic juggling is intentional. India prizes autonomy, leveraging engagement with competing powers rather than aligning fully with any.
“Hedging is a bad choice. But aligning with anyone is worse,” says Jitendra Nath Misra, former Indian ambassador and current professor at OP Jindal Global University. “India may not be confident of holding its own by siding with a great power. As a civilisational state, it seeks to emulate other powers in history that achieved status independently.”
Yet ambitions outpace capabilities. India’s $4 trillion economy is dwarfed by China’s $18 trillion and the US’s $30 trillion. Its military-industrial base remains underdeveloped; India is the world’s second-largest arms importer and not among the top five exporters. Indigenous platforms are limited, and most high-value military technology is imported.
This mismatch informs India’s cautious diplomacy. Modi’s China visit comes amid a tentative thaw following the deadly 2020 Galwan clashes. India’s $99 billion trade deficit with China—a figure larger than its defense budget—underscores the imbalance. Recent Chinese gestures, including Foreign Minister Wang Yi urging Delhi to see Beijing as a “partner” rather than a threat, signal a willingness to recalibrate ties.
Analysts caution, however, that managing China will remain India’s “core strategic preoccupation” for decades. Strategic dialogues with Beijing also allow Delhi and Beijing to signal to Washington that alternative blocs are possible.
India’s approach to Russia, meanwhile, shows little sign of yielding to US pressure. Discounted Russian crude remains critical for energy security, and Jaishankar’s recent Moscow visit reaffirmed the importance of maintaining a warm relationship despite Western sanctions and Russia’s growing dependence on China.
Trump’s public rebukes over cheap Russian oil, stalled trade negotiations, and claims of brokering an end to the war with Pakistan have further strained US-India ties. Yet history suggests strategic logic often prevails: previous US sanctions after India’s nuclear tests in 1974 and 1998 temporarily isolated Delhi, but less than a decade later, the two countries forged a landmark civilian nuclear deal.
The central question now is not whether ties with major powers will recover, but what shape they should take. Ashley Tellis of the Carnegie Endowment argues that India’s multipolar balancing risks security, advocating a privileged partnership with Washington to contain China. In contrast, former ambassador Nirupama Rao frames India as a “titan in chrysalis”—too large and ambitious to bind itself to a single great power, and better served by strategic ambiguity.
One thing is clear: Delhi is wary of a China-led, Russia-backed world order. “India’s choices are limited,” notes Sumit Ganguly of Stanford. “There is no prospect of a rapprochement with China—the rivalry will endure. Russia can be relied upon, but only to an extent. As for Washington, the US-India relationship will endure despite Trump’s idiosyncrasies.”
In the end, analysts agree: India’s best option may simply be to absorb the blows and exercise patience. Strategic patience—betting that storms pass and partners return—may be the country’s most enduring leverage.
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