Shanghai Summit: Diplomatic Showcase for Tehran or a New Chapter with China?

The simultaneous presence of leaders from China, Russia, and India at the 25th Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) summit in Tianjin has given the meeting unusual weight. For the Islamic Republic, the summit is an opportunity to leverage diplomacy to contain threats and ease mounting pressures. Isolated under sanctions and facing the looming risk of the UN “snapback” mechanism, Tehran is looking to Beijing and Moscow more than ever.

Iran’s president, Masoud Pezeshkian, did not attend the summit merely for ceremony. Coming just after a 12-day war with Israel, his participation in such a high-profile international forum is aimed at showing domestic audiences that Iran is not isolated and can still appear alongside global powers. At the same time, Pezeshkian must search for ways out of Iran’s deepening crises. Yet, Tehran’s strategy in Tianjin seems to revolve almost entirely around winning China’s support—a country that, while its largest oil customer, remains cautious in direct investment and security cooperation. This gap between Iran’s urgent needs and Beijing’s strategic caution casts doubt over what Tehran can actually achieve.

A Trip Overshadowed by Snapback Threats

Pezeshkian arrived in Tianjin on August 31, 2025, for what has been described as the most important SCO summit since its founding. His failure to attend the opening dinner and group photo, however, quickly drew criticism at home. Before departure, he had emphasized that the summit was a “rare opportunity to expand regional cooperation” and framed Iran’s participation as part of its push for multilateralism against Western unilateralism.

But in Tehran, expectations are far higher. The official account of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei reiterated his past remarks that Iran and China, with their ancient civilizations, “possess transformative power in the regional and global arena,” and stressed that implementing all aspects of their strategic partnership agreement was essential. The message, underscored by the presence of Khamenei’s envoy Mohsen Qomi at Pezeshkian’s farewell, signaled clearly that the trip’s real focus was bilateral ties with China—not the 28 other states at the summit.

Vice President Mohammad Reza Aref echoed this priority, calling the SCO gathering “a valuable chance for bilateral meetings with senior Chinese officials” and highlighting Tehran’s goal of strengthening cultural, historical, and strategic ties with Beijing.

Security Cooperation and Military Needs

The timing of the summit is notable. While China refrained from security cooperation with Iran during the recent war, media speculation in Israel has since claimed that Beijing may assist in rebuilding Iran’s missile arsenal. The allegations remain unconfirmed but are telling, given Tehran’s urgent need to restore deterrence.

Military cooperation between Iran and China has deep roots, dating back to missile collaboration in the 1980s. Chinese firms have long played a key role in supplying propulsion components and guidance systems for Iranian missiles and drones. In April 2025, the U.S. Treasury sanctioned several Chinese companies for allegedly providing solid-fuel materials to Iran’s Revolutionary Guard. With Russia’s defense industry weakened by the Ukraine war, Beijing is now in a stronger position than ever to supply Tehran’s needs.

Oil Discounts and Economic Imbalance

Pezeshkian’s trip cannot be separated from Iran’s dependence on oil sales to China. According to Reuters, nearly 90% of Iran’s crude exports head to Chinese markets—often disguised as Malaysian or third-country shipments. But these sales come at a steep discount.

Between January and September 2023, Iran reportedly gave China $4.2 billion in price cuts, offering each barrel at $6–12 below market value. With daily exports averaging 1.4 million barrels, the discount cost Tehran between $8.4 million and $16.8 million every day—over $6 billion annually. For Iran’s crisis-stricken economy, the loss is staggering; for China, it is negligible. This imbalance leaves Tehran dangerously vulnerable should Beijing choose alternative suppliers under renewed sanctions.

Still, Iranian officials persist in presenting ties with China as “strategic.” Ali Shamkhani of the Supreme National Security Council insisted that Pezeshkian’s visit, coupled with the Supreme Leader’s push to activate the 25-year strategic partnership, had created “new opportunities for resolving strategic deadlocks.” Yet, four years after the deal was signed, no concrete projects have materialized. Chinese investment in Iran remains minimal, a fact even pro-establishment newspapers like Farhikhtegan have openly acknowledged.

Former ambassador Mohammad Keshavarzzadeh points to sanctions, bureaucracy, and poor planning as the main barriers. He warns that partisan attitudes and negative propaganda damage relations, while also noting that Beijing itself remains cautious, unwilling to jeopardize its ties with the U.S. and Israel.

The Snapback Dilemma

Many Iranian officials see China’s stance on the looming snapback mechanism as the key outcome of Pezeshkian’s trip. Economist Albert Bagherian argues the most valuable gain would be Beijing’s opposition to renewing sanctions at the UN Security Council. He stresses that Iran must also create alternative banking mechanisms with China to secure oil revenues under pressure. Former diplomat Mohammad Hossein Adeli adds that China’s role in blocking snapback is “vital,” as only a joint Chinese-Russian stand can prevent a global consensus against Tehran.

Still, this may be wishful thinking. Some lawmakers argue Iran has survived sanctions before and can do so again by deepening ties with Russia and China while strengthening its domestic economy. Others, like former foreign minister Manouchehr Mottaki, go further—suggesting Iran threaten to exit the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) to force Western concessions.

Between Threat and Dependence

In this climate of anxiety, Iran’s National Security Council has instructed media to avoid “hysterical” or “crisis-inducing” coverage of the snapback threat. Yet public concern is growing, and much of the domestic debate around Pezeshkian’s visit has revolved around whether China will stand by Tehran.

For the Islamic Republic, the SCO summit represents more than a multilateral forum—it is a test of whether ties with China and Russia can evolve into genuine strategic partnerships or remain symbolic tools to buy time. The answer depends less on summit speeches than on Beijing and Moscow’s next moves, and on Iran’s own ability to overcome its chronic contradictions.

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