Hydropolitics and Regime Crisis: Sadat’s Nile-to-Israel Proposal

Introduction

The political career of Egyptian President Anwar al-Sadat (1918–1981) remains controversial, marked by two defining moments: the 1973 October War and the 1978–1979 Camp David Accords with Israel. While the peace process cemented Sadat’s image abroad as a statesman, domestically it provoked fierce opposition. Less discussed, yet equally consequential, was his alleged willingness to divert Nile waters to Israel. This proposal not only touched on Egypt’s existential security but also nearly triggered two coup attempts against him.

This essay examines Sadat’s “water diplomacy” within the broader context of Middle Eastern hydro-politics, analyzes the attempted coups it provoked, and situates the episode within Egypt’s long struggle to reconcile external pressures with internal legitimacy.

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Nile Water and the Israeli Question

The Nile has been the foundation of Egyptian civilization for millennia. By the 20th century, it also became the cornerstone of Egyptian national security. Scholars note that for Egypt, the Nile is “category A security”: any threat to its flow justifies direct military intervention without parliamentary approval (Bulloch & Darwish, 1993, p. 44).

For Israel, water security has been equally existential. Since the 1950s, Zionist planners sought to expand arable land in the Negev and considered both the Litani (Lebanon) and the Nile as potential sources (Allan, 2001). Sadat’s openness to supplying Israel with Nile water therefore represented the convergence of two strategic imperatives.

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Sadat’s Secret Offer

Journalist Mohammed Hassanein Heikal (2006) recounts how, during 1979 negotiations, Prime Minister Mustafa Khalil and Foreign Minister Boutros Boutros-Ghali learned that Sadat had secretly offered to build a pipeline from the Nile to Israel’s Negev desert. Begin’s angry remark—“I will not trade Israel’s sovereignty for Nile water”—confirmed the offer (Heikal, vol. II).

When confronted, Sadat dismissed objections: “So what? We’ll give them this water.” Khalil strongly opposed, citing Egypt’s water deficit and Sudanese borrowing. Legal experts also warned that diverting Nile water would:

1. Require approval from all riparian states.

2. Risk creating permanent usufruct rights for Israel under international law.

3. Undermine Egypt’s already precarious quota (Bulloch & Darwish, 1993).

Sadat, however, reframed the plan as “water for Palestinians,” reflecting both his political cunning and his detachment from the Nile’s symbolic weight in Egyptian nationalism.

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Camp David and the Water Question

At Camp David (1978), Israel pressed the water issue again. While Sadat appeared receptive, Egypt’s military establishment was not. U.S. intelligence noted that Defense Minister Abdel-Halim Abu Ghazala warned Sadat he could not guarantee army loyalty if water was ceded to Israel (Bulloch & Darwish, 1993).

This reveals a critical distinction: while peace with Israel was divisive, water concessions were intolerable. For the Egyptian military, protecting the Nile was not just strategy—it was identity.

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The Coup Attempts

Two coup plots underscore the depth of military and political resistance to Sadat’s water policy:

1. The First Coup (1978)

   • Planned as a staged uprising by unions and opposition forces, followed by army intervention.

   • Trigger point: Sadat’s signing of an agreement involving Nile water.

   • Collapsed when Nasserist MP Kamal Ahmad, approached for parliamentary cover, reported the conspirators (Darwish & Bulloch, 1993).

2. The Second Coup (1978–79)

   • More sophisticated, led by intelligence officer Major Mahmoud Nour al-Din (then military attaché in London).

   • Nour al-Din obtained documents on Sadat’s plan and approached exiled General Saad al-Shazly, considered the only figure capable of uniting the army.

   • U.S. intelligence intercepted communications, and CIA Director Stansfield Turner personally warned Sadat during Camp David.

   • American pressure led Sadat to abandon overt discussion of the water issue, though mistrust within the army deepened.

These coup attempts demonstrate that Sadat’s authority rested not on military loyalty but on U.S. diplomatic and intelligence backing.

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Analysis: Water as a Catalyst for Regime Crisis

1. Strategic Miscalculation

Sadat misjudged the symbolic and material weight of the Nile. While land-for-peace was tolerable, water-for-peace was politically suicidal.

2. U.S. Mediation and Dependence

The CIA’s role in exposing the coup plans illustrates the degree of U.S. leverage over Sadat’s survival. Washington was invested in Camp David’s success and intervened to shield him from domestic backlash.

3. Military Autonomy

The episode confirms that the Egyptian military defined itself as custodian of national survival, with independent veto power over existential issues like water—even against the president.

4. Long-Term Consequences

• Ethiopia’s alignment with Israel, partly born of Egyptian weakness during this period, continues to shape the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) crisis today.

• Sadat’s willingness to gamble with the Nile reinforced the perception of him as a “reckless gambler” (Heikal, 1983), contrasting with Nasser’s nationalist defiance.

• The erasure of Shazly from Egypt’s war memorial and the sidelining of Nour al-Din highlight how post-Sadat regimes sought to suppress alternative nationalist narratives.

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Conclusion

Sadat’s flirtation with diverting Nile waters to Israel reveals a deeper truth: that control of water, more than ideology or territory, has the power to destabilize regimes in the Middle East. The attempted coups underscore how central the Nile is to Egyptian national security and identity.

Ultimately, Sadat’s political survival during Camp David rested not on domestic legitimacy but on U.S. protection. His assassination in 1981 was not caused by the water issue directly, but the earlier coup attempts show that his presidency had already been eroded by choices that alienated his military and deep state.

The history of these events offers a sobering lesson: in Egypt, leaders can negotiate peace and even territorial concessions, but the Nile remains untouchable.

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References

• Allan, J. A. (2001). The Middle East Water Question: Hydropolitics and the Global Economy. I.B. Tauris.

• Bulloch, J., & Darwish, A. (1993). Water Wars: Coming Conflicts in the Middle East. London: Gollancz. [Arabic trans. 1999, Supreme Council of Culture, Cairo].

• Heikal, M. H. (1983). Autumn of Fury: The Assassination of Sadat. London: Andre Deutsch.

• Heikal, M. H. (2006). Secret Negotiations Between Arabs and Israel (Trilogy). Cairo.

• Versaille, A. (2007). Sixty Years of Conflict in the Middle East: Testimonies to History.

 

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