Playing the Kurdish Card in Syria

The Kurdish tone of escalation against the central government in Damascus has risen notably in recent months, particularly through stalling the implementation of the March 10 agreement, signed between President Ahmad al-Shar’a and the commander of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), Mazloum Abdi. Kurdish actors have been attempting to reinterpret the agreement in ways that contradict its substance and intended goals.

The core issues at stake are:

• the integration of Kurdish-formed military structures into the frameworks of the Syrian Ministry of Defense,

• the handover of state institutions to Damascus,

• and the restoration of government authority over territories currently under SDF control.

Instead, Kurdish leaders have recently emphasized retaining self-administration and repeatedly declared that Kurds will only accept a decentralized solution. They are also trying to speak in the name of Syria’s other minorities, portraying themselves as representatives of a united front of ethnic and religious groups against the central authority.

They have even signaled readiness for all options, including separation from Syria, in order to preserve the political and territorial gains achieved since 2012. This represents a direct and open challenge to the new Syrian leadership, raising the question: what are the real factors pushing the Kurds to this brink of confrontation?

Based on the unfolding dynamics inside Syria, the Kurdish self-administration is leveraging a number of developments:

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1. The Situation in Suwayda

It is no secret that the Kurdish administration has, directly or indirectly, influenced Syria’s current landscape—by encouraging local demands for autonomy or by providing logistical support and political cover.

In Suwayda, home to the Druze minority, calls for autonomy have peaked, with some factions even demanding independence. However, the movement led by the spiritual leader Sheikh Hikmat al-Hijri, which advocates secession, is vulnerable to internal setbacks. Once the initial shock fades, local nationalist forces are expected to regroup, especially as corruption and mismanagement of resources become increasingly visible.

For the Kurds, this means that the window of opportunity to exploit Suwayda’s momentum is shrinking. To maintain pressure, they may feel compelled to open a new front elsewhere, keeping tensions alive. Moreover, unrest has been resurging in the coastal (Alawi) regions. Should both Suwayda and the coast perceive Kurdish weakness, the broader momentum of decentralization could collapse.

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2. Lessons from Suwayda

The Druze experience demonstrated that significant political objectives could be achieved at relatively low cost. Although they lost hundreds of fighters in clashes with government forces, they still secured a quasi-autonomous status and gained a stronger bargaining position.

For the Kurds, the lesson is clear: under current regional conditions, the price of escalation is tolerable compared to the potential reward. Even if thousands of SDF fighters are lost, that sacrifice could pave the way toward a historic goal—an independent Kurdish state, a dream nurtured for generations.

In political strategy, escalation can sometimes be the shortest route to achieving maximalist goals, despite the risks involved.

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3. The Tribal Factor

Many Arab tribal groups remain integrated into the SDF framework. These tribes provide crucial manpower and could serve as cannon fodder in any confrontation with the Damascus government before ethnic polarization pushes Arabs out of the Kurdish-led administration.

The Kurds also exploit divisions among Arab tribes. A significant bloc remains hesitant to side with Damascus—either due to lingering loyalty to the previous system or because of pragmatic alliances with Kurdish leadership. This fragmentation gives the Kurds short-term leverage.

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4. The Christian Card

The SDF includes segments of the Christian community, particularly Assyrians and Syriacs, within its military and administrative structures. Yet, as the general Christian stance across Syria has shifted more favorably toward Damascus, the Kurds fear losing this cover in the northeast.

Christian presence is strategically useful: it enables the Kurds to frame themselves as protectors of minorities and to invoke the specter of genocide in their lobbying of Western governments. By highlighting potential threats to Christians, the SDF can activate pressure from U.S. Congress, the Pentagon, and intelligence agencies—actors that are generally hostile to Islamist movements and more sympathetic to secular or minority-led groups.

Losing Christian participation would deprive the Kurds of an important card in their dealings with Washington and European capitals.

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5. The Israeli Factor

The Kurds also count on the regional weight of Benjamin Netanyahu’s government, which has shown the ability to defy U.S. policy under Trump in the name of “Israeli security imperatives.” Large pro-Netanyahu blocs in Washington support granting Israel freedom to redraw the regional map as it sees fit.

For Kurdish leaders, this represents a historic opportunity. Netanyahu’s government has openly declared its intention to “protect minorities” in Syria. This could provide the Kurds with both a shield and a partner in any confrontation with Damascus.

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Kurdish Bets Going Forward

In escalating against the new Syrian leadership, the Kurds are banking on several key assumptions:

1. The limits of Damascus’s strength: The Suwayda crisis has exposed the weakness of the central government’s political and media reach. Kurdish leaders calculate that President al-Shar’a cannot risk a full-scale military confrontation with them and will instead be forced into compromise.

2. Unity of battlefronts: The possibility of coordinated action between Suwayda, the coastal regions, and Kurdish territories—with Israeli backing—could paralyze Damascus. The establishment of de facto autonomous zones in three regions would weaken the central state significantly, possibly even forcing it to accept Kurdish secession, particularly if Israel escalates by striking command centers and supply lines.

3. Influence over U.S. policy: The Kurdish administration benefits from divisions within Washington. The Pentagon and CIA favor maintaining influence in Syria, while the State Department follows presidential directives for withdrawal. In practice, the military-security establishment often carries greater weight than the diplomatic corps.

These dynamics complicate efforts to integrate Kurdish forces into Syrian state structures, especially after Suwayda’s developments heightened Kurdish fears of facing a similar fate as the Druze.

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Final Note

The Kurdish self-administration is embedded in a web of local, regional, and international alliances, and its decision to escalate is carefully calculated within that network. For the Damascus government, the danger is clear: being drawn into a confrontation on terrain where the other side has prepared its cards well.

Thus, President al-Shar’a’s administration must craft a measured, strategic response—one that avoids playing into Kurdish hands by stumbling into a war they have been preparing for, and instead focuses on exploiting Kurdish vulnerabilities while shoring up alliances across Syria’s fractured landscape.

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