In an article published by Foreign Affairs, Hussein Kalout, professor of political science at the University of Brasília, examines the escalating diplomatic and trade crisis between Donald Trump’s administration in Washington and President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva’s government in Brazil. At the center of this confrontation lies Brazil’s deepening economic partnership with China—raising questions about the country’s future role in the global order and the implications for its economy.
A key question analysts ask is whether Trump’s use of tariffs and sanctions is merely a bargaining tactic to extract trade concessions from Brazil, or whether it represents an attempt to reshape Brazil’s political order itself.
From “Liberation Day” Tariffs to Escalation
When Trump first announced his sweeping “Liberation Day” tariffs in April 2025, Brazil largely escaped serious damage. Brazilian exports to the U.S. were subjected to a modest 10% tariff—considered the baseline rate—while Washington’s close allies faced far harsher penalties.
By late July, however, the White House dramatically escalated the confrontation, declaring that Brazilian exports would face tariffs of up to 50%, among the highest levels imposed globally. The administration justified the new tariffs by citing alleged “political persecution and human rights violations” against former President Jair Bolsonaro, a Trump ally now facing prosecution for orchestrating a failed insurrection after losing re-election in 2022. Washington even canceled visas for eight of Brazil’s eleven Supreme Federal Court justices and sanctioned Justice Alexandre de Moraes under the Global Magnitsky Act.
These measures, seen in Brasília as a direct attack on the country’s judiciary and sovereignty, were interpreted as an attempt to weaken Lula’s government ahead of Brazil’s 2026 elections.
A Strategic Backfire
Rather than advancing U.S. interests, these steps have triggered backlash across Brazil. Public opinion polls show that most Brazilians disapprove of Trump’s actions, further isolating Bolsonaro politically. Even Brazil’s traditionally pro-Washington business elites have grown uneasy, recognizing that tariffs undermine the competitiveness of Brazilian exports and disrupt access to global supply chains.
As a result, conservative sectors once eager to align with Washington are now more inclined to support Lula’s diversification strategy, which seeks to reduce dependence on the United States by expanding ties with other partners—chief among them China.
For Beijing, Washington’s missteps have opened new geopolitical space. In 2023, Brazil–China trade reached US$181.5 billion, a record high, with China importing US$122.4 billion in Brazilian goods—mainly soybeans, beef, and iron ore—while exporting US$59.1 billion in manufactured goods to Brazil (China Briefing, 2024). By contrast, total U.S.–Brazil trade in 2024 was US$127.4 billion, but heavily imbalanced: the U.S. ran a US$29.3 billion surplus (USAFacts, 2025).
In other words, Brazil is indispensable to China as a supplier of food and raw materials, while the U.S. treats Brazil more as a buyer of its industrial and technological exports. This asymmetry has shifted perceptions among Brazil’s elites, who now see Beijing as a more pragmatic partner.
Brazil Between Washington and Beijing
For Brazil’s policymakers, U.S. pressure comes at a time when the global order itself appears to be shifting. The perception in Brasília is that U.S.-led unipolarity is in decline and that a multipolar system—anchored by major powers and supported by the “Global South”—is emerging (Kalout, 2024).
Brazil’s aspiration is to play a leadership role within this multipolar world, not as a client state of Washington, but as a bridge among emerging powers. Institutions like BRICS have become essential platforms: Brazil has used the bloc to create the New Development Bank, strengthen security cooperation with India, and reduce dependence on the U.S. dollar.
At the same time, Brazil does not wish to cut ties with the United States altogether. Historically, the two countries have cooperated on regional security, counter-narcotics, and defense agreements. During World War II, Brazil even allowed the U.S. to establish air bases on its territory in exchange for industrial development. However, Trump’s coercive style undermines the trust and pragmatism that once underpinned the relationship.
Trump’s Miscalculation
Trump’s advisers increasingly view Brazil’s growing alignment with China as a direct threat to U.S. dominance in Latin America. They see Bolsonaro as a pliant ally who could realign Brazil with Washington, whereas Lula is deemed too independent and too committed to the Global South agenda.
Yet Trump’s strategy appears counterproductive. Far from weakening Lula, sanctions have triggered a “rally-around-the-flag” effect, strengthening the president’s domestic popularity. Even Brazil’s agribusiness—long a bastion of conservative politics—acknowledges that severing ties with China is unthinkable. China now accounts for 30.7% of Brazil’s exports, compared to just 11% for the United States (SantanderTrade, 2024).
Moreover, Chinese investment is expanding. In 2024, Chinese FDI in Brazil reached US$4.2 billion, more than double the previous year, making Brazil the third-largest global destination for Chinese capital (TradingEconomics, 2025).
In fact, Beijing has already responded to U.S. tariffs by pledging to expand purchases of Brazilian commodities, further anchoring Brazil’s reliance on China. Meanwhile, Canada and Europe are accelerating trade agreements with Mercosur, giving Brazil alternatives to Washington.
Broader Implications
The crisis highlights a paradox: in trying to pressure Brazil into alignment, Washington may be accelerating the very multipolarity it fears. By eroding U.S. soft power and credibility, Trump has strengthened Beijing’s role not just in Brazil but across Latin America.
Brazil’s diplomats remain careful not to frame China as a replacement for the U.S. Instead, their foreign policy emphasizes diversification, autonomy, and pragmatism. Nevertheless, Trump’s confrontational approach risks forcing Brazil into a binary choice between Washington and Beijing—something Lula has long sought to avoid.
If the U.S.–Brazil rupture deepens, the consequences will be far-reaching. Economically, it would consolidate China’s position as Brazil’s principal partner, embedding Chinese firms in strategic sectors from energy to technology. Geopolitically, it would weaken Brazil’s ability to serve as a bridge between the Global South and the West. Domestically, it could shape the outcome of Brazil’s 2026 elections, where sovereignty and economic independence are likely to dominate the debate.
Conclusion
Trump’s escalating confrontation with Brazil illustrates a broader dilemma in U.S. foreign policy: the overreliance on coercive tools such as tariffs and sanctions, which often backfire in complex multipolar environments.
Rather than isolating Lula and empowering Bolsonaro, Washington’s measures have reinforced Brazil’s sovereignty narrative, strengthened its ties with China, and accelerated the decline of U.S. influence in Latin America.
In short, Trump may have fallen into his own trap. By weaponizing trade and sanctions against Brazil, he has undermined the very strategic position he sought to defend, leaving China as the long-term beneficiary of Washington’s missteps.
References
-
Banco Central do Brasil (2025). Inflation Report: External Sector Statistics. Brasília.
-
China Briefing (2024). “China–Brazil Economic Ties: Trade, Investment, and Opportunities.”
-
Kalout, H. (2024). Brazil’s Foreign Policy in a Multipolar World. Foreign Affairs.
-
SantanderTrade (2024). “Brazilian Foreign Trade in Figures.”
-
TradingEconomics (2025). “Brazil Foreign Direct Investment.”
-
USAFacts (2025). “What is the value of U.S. trade with Brazil?”
Support Dawat Media Center
If there were ever a time to join us, it is now. Every contribution, however big or small, powers our journalism and sustains our future. Support the Dawat Media Center from as little as $/€10 – it only takes a minute. If you can, please consider supporting us with a regular amount each month. Thank you
DNB Bank AC # 0530 2294668
Account for international payments: NO15 0530 2294 668
Vipps: #557320
Support Dawat Media Center
If there were ever a time to join us, it is now. Every contribution, however big or small, powers our journalism and sustains our future. Support the Dawat Media Center from as little as $/€10 – it only takes a minute. If you can, please consider supporting us with a regular amount each month. Thank you
DNB Bank AC # 0530 2294668
Account for international payments: NO15 0530 2294 668
Vipps: #557320
Comments are closed.