The Black Sea Dilemma: Russia and Turkey on Europe’s Security Frontier

M.T.B

151

In the Middle Ages, trade between the Black Sea and the Eastern Mediterranean flourished so greatly that sailors considered the two basins organically connected. What was once a commercial lifeline has, in modern times, transformed into a geopolitical artery.

Since the outbreak of the Russia–Ukraine war, the linkage between these two maritime regions has become more than symbolic. The food security of the Eastern Mediterranean now depends on grain shipments from Russia and Ukraine, while the Black Sea littoral states rely heavily on vital goods arriving from Mediterranean ports.

Yet, the war in Ukraine has laid bare Russia’s ambitions to project its influence beyond its immediate neighborhood—toward the Western Balkans, the South Caucasus, and the Eastern Mediterranean. Should Moscow succeed, this would amount to a direct challenge to the European Union’s collective security framework.

This reality reveals how regional security has shifted from a narrow geographic concept into a wider, interconnected one. The Black Sea and the Eastern Mediterranean are no longer separate theaters: they have merged into a single geopolitical space where great powers and regional actors collide. At the heart of this merger stands Turkey—straddling both basins, leveraging their rivalries for its own political advantage.

This dynamic explains Ankara’s maneuvering in Syria: on one hand supporting the current governing order, on the other hand benefiting from the tacit support of the United States and Europe, who remain eager to see Russian influence in Syria curtailed.


Russia and the Black Sea

For Russia, the Black Sea is a vital strategic lifeline: its gateway to warm waters and its maritime bridge to global trade. Consequently, Moscow seeks to weaken, dominate, or militarily absorb its neighbors.

This strategy has been evident for decades. Russia seized parts of Georgia’s coastline in 2008, recognized and occupied Abkhazia, annexed Crimea, and established control over swathes of Ukraine. In Moldova, it props up the separatist enclave of Transnistria to exert leverage over Chişinău.

Such behavior has driven Russia’s neighbors closer to NATO and the EU. Of the five states bordering the Black Sea, three—Turkey (since 1952), Bulgaria, and Romania—are NATO members. Meanwhile, the aspirations of Georgia and Ukraine to join the alliance remain blocked largely by Europe’s fear of provoking Moscow.

Here, Turkey emerges as the critical stabilizer. Committed to safeguarding trade flows through the Black Sea, Ankara has resisted NATO’s permanent naval presence there and instead formed ad hoc cooperation groups with littoral states to counter naval mines.

By contrast, Turkey has been less successful in the Eastern Mediterranean, where Russian ambitions continue to expand. Despite setbacks in Syria and Libya, Moscow has cultivated strong ties with eastern Libya and Egypt while simultaneously maintaining pragmatic relations with Ankara. Turkey, for its part, seeks to moderate Russia’s ambitions without fully confronting them—a balancing act that has worked only partially.


The Wider Geopolitical Tangle

Russia’s sense of maritime “suffocation” has intensified as NATO consolidated dominance in the Baltic Sea, particularly after Sweden’s recent accession. Yet the Black Sea and the Eastern Mediterranean remain flashpoints where NATO’s ability to contain Russian ambitions is far less certain.

Disputes over Eastern Mediterranean gas reserves, compounded by Israel’s military assertiveness and energy ambitions, risk escalating into a broad confrontation. The absence of fair and clearly demarcated maritime boundaries only heightens tensions, pushing the region toward unpredictable crises.

Adding to the volatility are the overlapping ambitions of Western energy companies. Their competition for access to gas reserves often transforms into political friction between states that are otherwise strategic partners. In such an environment, rivalry easily mutates into confrontation.

China and Russia, observing these frictions, are waiting for opportunities to secure a share of the region’s resources. Meanwhile, Turkey’s growing drilling and exploration capabilities—once underestimated by Europe and the United States—have positioned Ankara as an unexpected energy actor. Turkey not only seeks to exploit its own maritime zone but also aspires to a share of resources beyond its legal waters.


Europe’s Strategic Question

As maritime security in the Black Sea becomes increasingly precarious, Europe must grapple with a larger strategic question: what future awaits stability in both the Black Sea and the Eastern Mediterranean?

The fates of Libya and Syria are central to the answer. Instability in either country, or a renewed struggle for influence within them, inevitably spills into the maritime domain—from Russian presence in the Black Sea to shipping routes extending through the Suez Canal and the Western Mediterranean. The consequence is direct pressure on Europe’s supply chains and energy security.

The future therefore demands a collective effort. The states bordering the Black Sea and those along the Eastern Mediterranean must sit together at the negotiating table to forge new security and economic arrangements. Only through such dialogue can they safeguard their shared interests in a region where local rivalries and global ambitions intersect.

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If there were ever a time to join us, it is now. Every contribution, however big or small, powers our journalism and sustains our future. Support the Dawat Media Center from as little as $/€10 – it only takes a minute. If you can, please consider supporting us with a regular amount each month. Thank you
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