Why Hamas Might Choose to “Not Obstruct” the Trump Plan

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Hamas is undoubtedly facing the most difficult period in its history since its founding in 1987. Its decision regarding the Trump administration’s plan for a ceasefire may be more bitter than the war itself—a two-year-long genocide endured by the Palestinian people amid international abandonment. However, politics is not a realm for raw emotion.

While Hamas is in a strategic predicament, Israel itself is in a historic quagmire from which it will not emerge unchanged, regardless of the circumstances or the final outcome.

In this context, it might be most prudent for Hamas and other resistance factions to announce an immediate stance of “not obstructing” the implementation of the Trump plan to end the war on Gaza and protect its people from genocide. This would pave the way for delivering aid to the Palestinians in a manner befitting their immense sacrifices.

Crucially, this position would not—and should not—require a direct declaration of acceptance or rejection of the plan. Maintaining this ambiguity is strategically sound. Resistance movements are not obliged to have a binary stance dictated to them, especially when what is on the table is labeled a “plan,” not a formal “agreement.”

An announcement of “non-obstruction” conveys several clear messages:

  1. Hamas is not opposing Arab and international will to stop the genocide—a demand shared by all Palestinians above all else.

  2. It demonstrates a pragmatic urgency, allowing technical teams to immediately begin work on details, as every minute of delay claims another victim.

This stance of “non-obstruction” would signal Hamas’s acceptance of the main pillars for the next phase:

  • A permanent ceasefire.

  • A prisoner exchange, concluding this file.

  • A confirmation that Hamas does not seek to be part of any future governing body in Gaza.

Hamas should stipulate that any new administration must be practical, viable, and not threaten the civil peace, reflecting Gaza’s unique social, economic, and political context. The composition of this administration—whether it includes Palestinian leaders from Gaza alongside international figures—should not be a point of major sensitivity, provided it is a transitional arrangement, not a permanent one.

The Palestinian position must link all these elements to a clear demand for a later stage: transparent, democratic elections whose results are respected by the international community.

Contextualizing International Involvement

Minimizing sensitivity about foreign involvement in Gaza’s administration is reasonable for two key reasons:

First, a significant portion of services in Gaza have historically been provided by UNRWA (the UN Relief and Works Agency), as the majority of Gazans are refugees. The top management and commissioners of UNRWA have always been international staff.

Second, the de facto government in Gaza since October 7th has been comprised of approximately fifty individuals representing international institutions. These officials coordinate with the Israeli military’s Southern Command and effectively control all movement of people and aid into and within the Strip. Therefore, Gaza is already practically governed by these international bodies, with the Ramallah-based Palestinian Authority and the former Gaza government having negligible roles.

Thus, the logical position is to formally insist that UN bodies be core partners in managing the next phase—a demand likely to gain broad international support. Following from the “non-obstruction” stance, the direct request would be for a legitimate, central role for the United Nations in administering this plan.

The Crucial Distinction: A “Plan” vs. an “Agreement”

This position will undoubtedly face Israeli and American skepticism. However, it must be made clear that, according to the proposed protocols, the Trump proposal is a “plan,” not an “agreement.” This is a critical distinction.

When a third party (protocol-wise, the Americans can be considered as such) proposes a plan, the affected party has multiple options for expressing its stance—the minimum being a commitment not to obstruct its implementation. However, if the framework were a bilateral agreement, as in past wars, then a clear yes-or-no position would be mandatory. It is illogical to present a plan that effectively cancels out one party and then demand its explicit approval.

The Broader Strategic Landscape

The fundamental rule resistance movements in Gaza must consider is that a defining feature of international relations in the Middle East is the disregard for agreements and commitments. The masters of this approach are the United States and Israel, especially amidst the global instability following the Russo-Ukrainian War.

This is both a challenge and, at this stage, a peculiar advantage, as even the architects of this system cannot predict its outcomes. It is a grave mistake to believe that the U.S. and Israel are operating with clear, strategic direction in managing the region post-October 7th, after the massive attrition this war has inflicted on all sides.

It is vital to remember that throughout two years of conflict, Israel has not decisively resolved any of its core security files—not in Gaza, the West Bank, Lebanon, Syria, or Iran, nor even more distant fronts like Yemen. It is unlikely to resolve them in the future.

Israel’s internal and external crises are only beginning; the repercussions of this war after it ends will be far greater than those during the fighting. The Palestinian task, meanwhile, is to build upon the international momentum generated not by political maneuvering, but by the blood of Gaza’s children and women, which caused a paradigm shift that now requires massive, systematic effort to sustain.

The next phase of the conflict will be defined by the international movement to accuse Israel of apartheid. Two pillars have long underpinned Israel’s moral image in the Western narrative: the Holocaust and democracy. The first has been tarnished by the charge of genocide; the second is being dismantled by the charge of apartheid.

The Palestinian cause stands at a critical, difficult, and brutal historical juncture, facing an Israeli perspective seeking a “historic resolution” to the conflict over the land. Yet, simultaneously, it is presented with unprecedented opportunities born from the events of October 7th and the subsequent bitter war of genocide. These events have resurrected the Palestinian issue from the coffin of liquidation and complete erasure into new, inescapable international spaces—if the Palestinians and their supporters can skillfully leverage them in the coming phase.

In the end, this region will not know stability without a just solution for the Palestinian people. No power can erase the history, narrative, resistance, or the very life of the Palestinian people.

 

 

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If there were ever a time to join us, it is now. Every contribution, however big or small, powers our journalism and sustains our future. Support the Dawat Media Center from as little as $/€10 – it only takes a minute. If you can, please consider supporting us with a regular amount each month. Thank you
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