A Unified Front: Egypt and Turkey Warn Israel

The joint naval exercises between the Turkish and Egyptian navies, launched in 2009 under the name “Sea of Friendship,” continued annually until 2013, when they were suspended due to political disagreements between the two countries. However, with the normalization of relations, the joint maneuvers have resumed, taking place from September 22 to 26 this year.

According to Zeki Aktürk, the official spokesperson for the Turkish Ministry of Defense, the goal of the exercises is to “develop bilateral relations and enhance interoperability between Turkey and Egypt.”

These maneuvers have attracted significant attention within Turkey and across the region, given the current events and developments. They come at a time when regional countries are facing escalating threats from Israel, nearly two years after the aggression on the Gaza Strip, which was triggered by the Al-Aqsa Flood operation.

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu is emboldened by the military successes his forces have achieved in targeting six Arab capitals and assassinating numerous resistance figures and official military leaders in those countries. This has extended Israeli threats to include warnings to both Ankara and Cairo of a similar fate.

Although these threats are unofficial, they have impacted both countries, leading to increased military preparedness and a search for new avenues of cooperation with Arab and Islamic nations.

The defensive shifts in the region following the Israeli attack on Doha are not limited to Turkey and Egypt. For instance, Saudi Arabia swiftly signed a joint defense agreement with Pakistan, which observers described as a “surprising and shocking geopolitical development.”

Thus, the circumstances surrounding the “Sea of Friendship” maneuvers have heightened their significance for both countries, drawing the attention of nations directly affected by the deepening Turkish-Egyptian cooperation, particularly Israel and Greece.

Ankara and Cairo are currently experiencing the best period in their modern history, as declared by Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan in a televised interview with an Arab channel—a statement later reaffirmed by President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan in press remarks.

The Israeli aggression on Gaza has played a significant role in strengthening and deepening bilateral relations, with Fidan emphasizing that cooperation between the two countries on the Gaza issue is extensive and multifaceted.

These maneuvers have reignited important questions about the potential for military cooperation to evolve into a new defensive and security framework for regional countries. Naturally, questions have also arisen about the impact of this cooperation on the security of the Israeli state, as well as on unresolved issues in the Eastern Mediterranean, such as maritime border demarcation—a matter of concern to Greece and the southern part of Cyprus—and the Libyan file, including the possibility of ending the East-West division.

The Regional Security Architecture

The Baghdad Pact, established in 1955, was the last security structure Turkey participated in within the region, alongside Britain, Iraq, Iran, and Pakistan, aimed at countering communist influence. However, the pact began to disintegrate with the July 1958 revolution in Iraq and was dissolved following the 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran.

When the Justice and Development Party (AKP) came to power in 2002 under Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, Turkey’s foreign policy began repositioning itself in the Middle East. Its long-term goal was to build a new defensive security architecture relying on regional countries, without resorting to external powers.

However, Ankara has been unable to achieve this goal, particularly due to the significant regional developments accompanying the 2011 Arab Spring revolutions and subsequent events that exacerbated the region’s security and defense problems. This led to a rift between Ankara and several Arab capitals, coinciding with increased activity by non-state actors such as ISIS, the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), and its affiliates in Syria and Iraq.

The chaos that gripped the region over the past decade has resulted in severe security issues, undermining its cohesion and ability to confront Israeli threats. It has even impacted the political and diplomatic performance of key regional organizations, foremost among them the Arab League.

Hence, there is an urgent need to establish a new security and defense framework enabling the region to confront these challenges. Turkey and Egypt could lay the groundwork for this, provided there is shared will. The Israeli aggression against several Arab and Islamic countries—with potential for expansion—has demonstrated the fallacy of relying on external powers for security tasks.

The region’s need for a new security structure has become an utmost priority, no longer limited to Arab countries alone. It is now essential to rely on neighboring Islamic nations, particularly Turkey and Pakistan.

Confronting Israel

As mentioned, the Turkish-Egyptian maneuvers come at a time when Israeli threats against both countries are escalating. Thus, some view these exercises as a clear warning signal to Israel.

Moreover, military and defense developments in both countries indicate serious preparations. Turkey recently revealed its success in manufacturing a range of weapons, including ballistic missiles and smart bombs, which caught the attention of Israeli and European media.

Meanwhile, Cairo has increased its troop presence in Sinai, both in terms of personnel and weapons/equipment, prompting Tel Aviv to file a complaint with the United States, accusing Egypt of violating the terms of the 1979 peace treaty.

The culmination of these developments is the joint naval maneuvers between these two significant powers in the Eastern Mediterranean, each possessing one of the region’s strongest navies. This is an event that Tel Aviv cannot overlook without closely monitoring the potential trajectory of military cooperation between the two nations. This is especially true given Egypt’s earlier expression of interest in jointly manufacturing drones with Turkey.

However, this does not mean the near future will witness military confrontations between Israel and either country—unless Tel Aviv chooses otherwise. In the medium to long term, however, such confrontations cannot be ruled out given the severe tensions gripping the region and the world.

Greece… Cautious Apprehension

Greece is clearly concerned about the growing Turkish-Egyptian relations. Athens realizes that this steady growth could lead to maritime border demarcation between the two countries, which would undermine everything Greece has worked for over more than a decade with clear French-Israeli support.

Greece and the southern part of Cyprus have worked on maritime border demarcation with Egypt to deprive Turkey of its right to its share of economic waters, thereby curbing its ability to explore for gas and hydrocarbon resources in the Eastern Mediterranean.

However, Turkish policy in recent years has sought to impose a fait accompli by demarcating maritime borders with the internationally recognized Libyan government in Tripoli and sending several naval missions to explore in the region. This has exacerbated disputes with Greece and the European Union, which attempted to impose serious sanctions against Turkey but failed due to a lack of consensus among its members.

Thus, Greece understands that any maritime border demarcation between Turkey and Egypt would mean Turkey has achieved its goals through legal and diplomatic means, and no one could prevent it from exploring in the Eastern Mediterranean.

Although Greece maintains distinguished relations with Egypt, it also realizes that the pressures of Middle Eastern turmoil may push Cairo to reposition itself and change its compass—especially since the demarcation maps proposed by Turkey grant the Egyptian side an additional maritime area of approximately ten thousand square kilometers.

Libya… The Elusive Peace

Every time Turkey and Egypt take an additional step toward normalizing bilateral relations, attention turns to Libya. The natural question arises: Can divided Libya, split between East and West, benefit from this step to end the division and reunify the country, given both countries’ influence there?

Recently, Turkey succeeded in extending its relations to eastern Libya after years of strained ties with Khalifa Haftar. Ankara hosted his two sons: Saddam, deputy commander of the eastern Libyan forces, and Balqasim, who oversees reconstruction.

Rumors circulated recently that Haftar might instruct the eastern parliament to approve the maritime border demarcation agreement, which was signed between the internationally recognized Tripoli government (under former Prime Minister Fayez al-Sarraj) and Turkey. However, no progress has been made on this file to date.

Clearly, there is little progress between the two countries regarding resolving the situation and ending the division. Differences persist without solutions, yet there is an (implicit) agreement on the need to manage these differences to prevent them from becoming a hotbed of conflict as in the past.

Thus, the joint maneuvers hosted by Turkey’s Muğla province between the Turkish and Egyptian navies stand as a remarkable indicator of the tremendous progress in bilateral relations. However, their impact must extend to the region’s volatile issues, commensurate with the significant political, strategic, and military capabilities of both countries.