In the realm of international politics, yesterday’s adversaries can swiftly become today’s negotiating partners, united by the pragmatic calculus of present interests and future opportunities. This dynamic was on full display as Syrian President Ahmed Al-Shar was received with full ceremony by Russian President Vladimir Putin within the walls of the Moscow Kremlin.
This meeting is particularly striking given the recent memory of a brutal war in which Russia was a principal actor, conducting airstrikes from Idlib to other Syrian provinces in defense of the since-deposed Assad regime. Yet, demonstrating strategic realism, the current Syrian government is engaging pragmatically with one of the world’s most significant international powers. This diplomatic dance began in early 2025 with the reception of a Russian deputy foreign minister in Damascus, escalating with a Syrian delegation—including the foreign and defense ministers—meeting President Putin in Moscow in July 2025. A visit by the Russian vice president to Damascus in September further cemented the dialogue.
President Al-Shar’s current trip to Moscow, accompanied by a high-level delegation including his foreign and defense ministers, intelligence chief, and head of the presidential office, underscores the meeting’s critical nature. The central question remains: what is the true agenda for the Syrian leadership with the Russian president, and what are the implications for the intertwined relationship between these two nations?
Syria’s Inescapable Need for Russian Arms
The Syrian military, heavily degraded by years of conflict and targeted by Israeli strikes, faces an urgent imperative: to maintain, repair, and modernize its remaining arsenal. For this, Russia remains the sole viable supplier.
As Damascus works to reconstitute its army and security forces to meet a spectrum of internal and external challenges, its need for new armaments, ammunition, and technical support is acute. Russia is the primary entity capable of fulfilling these needs, unencumbered by international sanctions and Western political conditions. Any discussion of Western military support for the Syrian government is premature, not least due to the significant Israeli influence dedicated to preventing it.
Beyond politics, a swift and simple transition from Eastern to Western weaponry is currently impossible. It is not just the former regime that relied on Russian arms; the armed opposition that rose up in 2011 also largely used Soviet-era weaponry. The factions that now form the government are themselves proficient with this hardware. Consequently, discussions on arms and resupply were a central feature of the presidents’ meeting, building on prior consultations between defense and intelligence officials. This file is likely the most straightforward area for understanding and agreement between the two sides.
Russia’s Strategic Imperative: The Mediterranean Bases
Russia’s initial defense of the Assad regime was predicated on its role as the guarantor of Russian interests in Syria. However, as the regime fragmented and became a liability, Moscow demonstrated flexibility, evident after the “Deterrence of Aggression” operations and the fall of the regime in Aleppo. This shift was crystallized in the Doha meetings of December 2024, where Russia reportedly offered to remove Bashar al-Assad from the scene, effectively halting the final battles and allowing opposition forces to enter Damascus peacefully.
Russia’s compass is now fixed firmly on preserving its core interests, primarily the strategic naval facility in Tartus and the Hmeimim airbase. For Moscow, these bases are non-negotiable. The Tartus base, in particular, is a logistical linchpin, supporting Russian operations across the Mediterranean, North Africa, and parts of the Middle East and East Africa. Without this foothold, Russia’s power projection capabilities far from the former Soviet sphere would be severely hampered.
In exchange for securing these assets, Damascus can expect to demand a positive Russian stance on several fronts: the generous provision of weapons, ammunition, fuel, and wheat; support in the UN Security Council for lifting sanctions; and political pressure on Tel Aviv, alongside American efforts, to encourage Netanyahu’s government to allow for stability in Syria. Conversely, Moscow retains the capacity for disruptive action, such as inciting remnants of the old regime or exacerbating tensions between the Syrian government and the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). The Syrian government is keenly aware of these levers and will seek to ensure Moscow plays a stabilizing, not a destabilizing, role.
The Future of Syrian-Russian Relations
Forging stable foreign relations is a formidable challenge for the Syrian government, positioned as it is in a geopolitical hotspot amid intense regional and international rivalries. Internally, Damascus has not yet fully consolidated its authority over all national territory or completed the rebuilding of its political and security institutions, which inherently limits its negotiating power with a major actor like Russia.
Externally, the Middle East remains in a state of high flux. The aftermath of the “Al-Aqsa Flood” and subsequent conflicts has reshaped the regional landscape, with Syria as a central theater. These confrontations, which have spread from Lebanon to Syria and potentially to Iraq, are ongoing. Iran, a key player, itself faces pressures that target its political system, not merely its external influence.
Given this volatile context, it is too early to predict a clear, definitive trajectory for Syria’s relationship with any external power, including Russia. The region remains in a state of significant political and security fluidity.
Nevertheless, stability in Syria is a prerequisite for stability in the wider region—an outcome supported by powers like the Gulf states, Turkey, and even Russia, whose interests are tied to development and calm. The United States’ position remains more ambiguous, heavily influenced by the approaches of Netanyahu’s right-wing government, which, paradoxically, aligns with certain Iranian interests in perpetuating a controlled chaos in Syria that prevents national unity and lasting stability.
In this new, uncertain alignment of forces, where the Western stance is unclear, a significant opportunity exists for both Damascus and Moscow. Despite a recent past stained with blood and tears, their mutual interests in weapons, bases, and regional equilibrium may compel them to open a new chapter, one defined by a pragmatic convergence of needs rather than the ghosts of a painful history.
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