While the Islamic world, and indeed the entire globe, has been watching with profound anxiety the ongoing massacres in Gaza, holding its breath in hope of a halt to this Israeli war of extermination, the specter of a new war was looming on the horizon between Afghanistan and Pakistan.
At a time that demands the utmost vigilance towards any developments that might overshadow the tragedy in Gaza and its associated humanitarian and political issues, a potential confrontation between two Muslim nations carries significant implications.
These developments gain added importance when recalling recent statements by former U.S. President Donald Trump, who called the withdrawal from Bagram Airfield a “mistake” and expressed an intent to return. To this, the Interior Minister of the Islamic Emirate, Sirajuddin Haqqani, retorted: “If they are prepared to fight a new, twenty-year war with us, then let them come and try.”
Shortly after these exchanges, tensions flared between Afghanistan and Pakistan—a stark and unfortunate reminder of the fragility of the Islamic world’s balances and their susceptibility to targeting and manipulation.
However, divine mercy preempted an explosion, as diplomatic efforts swiftly culminated in an agreement reached in Doha, brokered by Qatar and Turkey. The agreement bore the signature of the head of the Turkish Intelligence Agency, İbrahim Kalın, under the direct guidance of the President of the Republic of Turkey.
The image of the signing ceremony was indeed one of hope and pride, reaffirming Turkey’s pivotal role in crisis resolution alongside Qatar. This influence stems not merely from sound political judgment but from a genuine capacity to instill confidence in various parties, owing to the stature and prestige Turkey commands on both the Islamic and international stages.
It was announced that the technical details of the agreement would be discussed later in Istanbul, with the participation of the same parties, to build upon the Doha accord.
It is crucial to recall that similar tensions nearly erupted between Pakistan and India last May but were swiftly contained, with Turkey also playing a distinct role in that crisis. However, that settlement was partial and likely temporary, as the India-Pakistan conflict is rooted in the foundational structure of both states, transcends their geographical borders, and is not solely due to internal causes.
In the recent Afghanistan-Pakistan tension, the shadows of countries like India, the United States, and the Zionist entity were clearly discernible as hidden hands, present and ready to engage if needed—a deeply concerning observation.
The natural state of affairs should preclude any grounds for conflict between Afghanistan and Pakistan. Their shared values, interests, and potential far outweigh any motives for strife, calling instead for close cooperation that would yield great benefits for both nations.
As events unfolded on October 9th, Afghanistan’s Foreign Minister, Amir Khan Muttaqi, was visiting India to strengthen bilateral relations, leading some to infer that Afghanistan was sending a signal to Pakistan by drawing closer to India.
But the question remains: Was this signal merely an impression, or the start of a substantive relationship? It is worth noting that since assuming power, the Taliban government has pursued a multi-directional and peaceful diplomatic approach, aiming for national revival and breaking the shackles of international isolation.
At a time when most countries, even neighboring ones, refrained from recognition, Russia took the first initiative, and relations have since deepened. India also announced during this visit its intention to elevate relations to the level of full diplomatic representation, constituting a de facto recognition of the Taliban government.
It must be emphasized that the Taliban does not seek this recognition at the expense of any other country, particularly any Muslim nation. It is in the supreme interest of all Islamic countries to move towards normalizing relations with Afghanistan at the earliest opportunity. This serves their own interests while simultaneously preventing the Taliban from seeking exits from their predicament by knocking on the wrong doors.
My strongest impression from all my meetings with Afghan officials has been their sincere desire to expand political and economic relations with Islamic nations, foremost among them Turkey. If Turkey or other Muslim nations delay in building bridges, they forfeit any right to criticize the Taliban for seeking relationships with other powers.
The core of the dispute with Pakistan revolves around the “Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan” (TTP) and its relationship with Afghanistan. Founded in 2007 in the tribal areas of northwestern Pakistan, particularly South Waziristan, under the leadership of Baitullah Mehsud, a leader of the Pashtun Mehsud tribe. Mehsud had fought alongside the Afghan Taliban against the American occupation in 2001 and was killed in a U.S. drone strike in 2013, succeeded by Hakimullah Mehsud and then Maulvi Fazlullah.
The relationship between the Afghan Taliban and the Pakistani Taliban stems from their shared Deobandi school of thought and the Pashtun majority in both. (It should be noted that the Afghan Taliban is not exclusively Pashtun; as mentioned before, there is clear representation of various ethnicities in senior positions, almost reflecting their demographic weight).
The reality is that the border between Afghanistan and Pakistan divides peoples and tribes who share culture, origin, and language, such as the Pashtuns and Baloch. This is a line drawn by the British occupation during the colonial era in India. Consequently, this border separates the two countries only on the map, not in the demographic and cultural reality on the ground. This is why these regions merged into a semblance of unity during both the Soviet and American occupations.
During that era, the Pakistani Taliban fought side-by-side with their Afghan brethren, who were steeped in the same education from the same religious schools, spoke the same language, and drew from the same culture. However, after the war, the Islamic Emirate adopted a clear and explicit policy of not allowing its territory to be used against any other country, focusing on internal rebuilding and achieving comprehensive reconciliation, even to the point of declaring a general amnesty. This step marked a pivotal shift in the trajectory of the Islamic Emirate.
The Pakistani Taliban, however, maintains a hostile stance towards its government in Islamabad, accusing it of betrayal due to its relationship with the United States, and justifies its operations against the Pakistani state with this argument.
While Pakistan accuses the Afghan Taliban of turning a blind eye to the Pakistani Taliban’s activities within its borders, the Islamic Emirate rejects these accusations and does not acknowledge any responsibility for them.
Thus, the essence of the dispute is clear. It is not the type of conflict that is intractable to third-party mediation, especially if that party enjoys emotional and fraternal standing with both sides, as is the case with Turkey and Qatar.
Today, the Islamic world is in dire need of greater unity and an enhanced spirit of solidarity to confront common challenges. As long as the two Muslim nations in question place Islam at the core of their identity, they should not fail to resolve any dispute between them, no matter how complex.
Perhaps within this ordeal lies a hidden opportunity we cannot yet see—to turn adversity into advantage, provided we recognize the gravity of our shared problems and direct our energies towards solving them with consciousness and sincerity.
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