An Analysis of Stances and Opportunities in the Sudanese Negotiations

Before discussing negotiation or dialogue in Sudan, it is essential first to define these two concepts and identify the shifts and developments that have occurred among the warring parties. Negotiation is not an event isolated from the conditions on the ground; rather, it is an inevitable result of the intersection of wills and the shifting of balances. Therefore, analyzing the stances and opportunities for the military negotiators and the political dialoguers represents the first step towards understanding the potential outcomes for peace in Sudan.

The Political Landscape: A Fragmented Scene

The “Progress” Alliance and its Divisions

It can be said that the “Progress” alliance has succeeded in one fundamental matter throughout this war: it has carved out a place for itself in any future scenario for a solution, “whether internationally supervised or driven by local will.” Despite the political, governmental, and popular narratives promoting the impossibility of its existence in a post-war Sudan, the facts indicate that it will inevitably be part of any upcoming settlement.

Although some insist that the fragmentation within “Progress” is merely a tactical stance for political purposes, the possibility of this formalistic division turning into a genuine schism—depending on the course of negotiations—is not unlikely, should political interests demand it. This is because “Progress” is fundamentally a collection of political entities united by interest and necessity, and it could be divided by those very same reasons.

The “Establishment” and the “Steadfastness” Alliances

The military dimension of most components of the “Establishment” alliance—except for some individuals who officially represent themselves and not their parties—makes it difficult to incorporate them into the outcomes of any political dialogue. It makes their affiliation with military negotiation tables the more logical and likely scenario.

As for the “Steadfastness” alliance, which now stands in a political limbo following the split—in the purgatory of this war, so to speak—it is somewhat qualified and prepared to sit at the tables of political dialogue. However, the vision of “Steadfastness” remains limited, as it relies entirely on external support. It has not, and does not, comprehend the international variables in the balance of power, nor has it paid attention to the shifts in the game of musical chairs that may govern the international stances towards the parties of this conflict.

The Islamists: Between Facing Exclusion and Repositioning

Most politicians deal with the Islamists as a single bloc that is globally combated, and they try to exert pressure based on this belief locally. However, the reality is more complex. The experiences following the color revolutions in the Arab world—from Egypt and Tunisia to Syria recently—show that political Islam is not always combated; it may be reshaped with different facets, according to international interest.

The Islamists in Sudan themselves are not a unified current. They are governed by hidden battles and ideological and organizational differences, which are necessarily reflected in their stances towards political dialogue and military negotiation. Contrary to the wishes of their opponents, it will not be possible—in fact, it will be impossible—to completely exclude them from the scene for several reasons:

• First, in the view of most Sudanese—non-politicians—they have atoned for the mistakes of the former Salvation regime (which led to the revolution against it) through their active participation in defending the nation, offering significant sacrifices and rows of martyrs on the battlefield.

• Second, this war has redefined the concepts of good and evil, crime and punishment in the collective consciousness of most Sudanese revolutionaries (who supported the Sudanese army and turned against the political revolutionary forces that remained opposed to it in this war). This has caused the hostility of most revolutionaries towards the Islamists to diminish, with the exception of the “Progress” current and its allies and supporters.

Variables on the Ground and in Politics

The equations change day by day, both on the military field and in the nature of the stance towards the political structure of the two governments (the “legitimate government in Port Sudan and the virtual government in Nyala”). Regional and international alliances are also shifting. Foremost among these is the nature and future of the stance of specific international actors towards this war, and the stance of the combatants towards them. This is a pivotal element in understanding the roots and ambitions of this war and attempting to foresee its outcomes.

Therefore, the essential questions here are: Have the old ambitions receded, or have new ambitions emerged after two and a half years? Is the efficiency of the militia and its allies still effective in achieving those ambitions, or have new variables emerged in the nature of that effectiveness on one hand, and in the possibility of achieving some of them through the gateway of the army and its allies from the Islamists themselves, on the other? The answers to these questions determine the language of promoting peace, both on the level of international powers and the warring parties inside the country.

Then there is the impact of the force of the people’s will, represented in the armed popular resistance, which has changed much in the fate of this war, regardless of its facets: “demographic engineering… racist claims… internal political and economic ambitions… external economic ambitions… personal aspirations of individuals in power… etc.”

Finally, an unexpected and unaccounted-for factor emerged, changing the course of the entire scene significantly. It is a factor that must not be overlooked when discussing results and outcomes.

Potential Shifts Within the Military Institution

There is also the possibility of changes within the army itself, should discontent with the performance of the military-political authority increase. Some see its decisions as laxity or appeasement of the enemy, while others see them as rigidity under pressure from the Islamists. Consequently, the existence of a division within the military institution could reshape the map of alliances and open the door to new negotiation paths. This is a matter—regardless of one’s stance on it—that must not be ignored when analyzing the scene.

The Inevitability of Negotiation

No matter how long the war lasts or how complex its causes become, negotiation remains the only inevitable and logical outcome. However, its timing and form remain contingent on many factors, most notably the stances of the politically unaffiliated parties; because the interests of ideologically driven powers often color their reading of reality. History itself bears witness that more violent wars and more complex national issues have ended at negotiation tables, leading to transitional agreements that paved the way for activating the will of the people through ballot boxes.

In the final analysis, the key to ending this war remains “the nature of the pressures directed towards all parties, and the nature of the interests that those pressures may affect.” Negotiation, by its nature, is not a voluntary act but a product of balances between pressures and interests.

Herein lies a dilemma: How will the “Progress” alliance convince its base, which it previously incited on the necessity of excluding the other through this war? And how will the Islamists convince their base—whom they previously incited on the necessity of excluding the other through this war—to accept a political dialogue linked to military negotiation, leading to sustainable peace, which implies, among other things, the necessity of accepting the existence of the other?

These questions remain open, but they encapsulate the essence of the coming phase. In this phase, we must rely on the fact that peace will not be born from good intentions, but from transforming interest into a gateway for reason, acceptance, and reconciliation with the self—by debunking some of its contradictions—before reconciling with the other.

Potential Stances Towards Negotiation

Any discussion of negotiation cannot succeed without an accurate reading of the map of forces and balance of interests, and identifying possible points of convergence between the conflict parties. Accordingly, the situation can be analyzed based on the stances of the relevant parties as follows:

• The Army: Represents the legitimate regular force that derives its legitimacy from the constitution and the support of a broad segment of the people. However, internally, there are divergences in stances towards negotiation that it is unwise to ignore. One current sees negotiation as a necessity to save the state, while another sees it as a concession of sovereignty or submission to international pressure. The challenge here is to unify the military-political stance so that the general and unified concept of negotiation becomes an extension of a national duty, not a field defeat.

• The Rapid Support Forces (RSF): Operates as a de facto authority in areas under its control and seeks political recognition and a role in any forthcoming settlement. However, international legitimacy and popular acceptance are its main obstacles. Therefore, its return to the scene is only possible through clear security arrangements and conditional, gradual reintegration, coupled with accountability and transitional justice.

• The Islamist Current: Despite the controversy over its role in the excesses of the previous regime, its military participation in this war has restored a political presence that cannot be ignored. This current is expected to seek conditional participation in any political dialogue, guaranteeing it a role in the future without a full return to the Salvation discourse or its tools. Their stance towards negotiation is likely to be flexible if their necessary participation in the future transitional phase is recognized.

• The “Progress” Alliance and Revolutionary Components: This alliance represents the most organized civilian wing, but it faces a dual dilemma. How does it convince its base to accept negotiations with those it considers enemies of the revolution? And how does it ensure it is not excluded from future peace arrangements, given the considerable popular aversion towards it and accusations of treason and collusion? Therefore, its stance will likely be contingent on the extent of change in the international discourse towards the Islamists and the guarantees granted to it in power-sharing agreements.

• Regional and International Powers: The UAE, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Chad, and South Sudan represent keys to influencing the path of international participation in the negotiation. Meanwhile, Washington and Europe deal with pragmatism, balancing between stopping the war and protecting their interests. The file of a specific entity as a key international partner in this war, and how to deal with its stance, is crucial. Any negotiation project that does not take these external interests into account will be a theoretical one with no horizon.

Possible Avenues for Negotiation

1. Military-Security Track:

   • A ceasefire monitored by a regional mechanism with joint oversight.

   • Restructuring the armed forces and integrating the RSF according to a clear timeline and under limited international supervision.

   • Ensuring transitional justice through an independent national mechanism (a high-level committee).

2. Political-Civilian Track:

   • A national dialogue among civilian political components, including Islamists, other political forces, revolutionaries, and representatives of non-ideologized segments of the population.

   • Forming a technocratic-consensual transitional government with a defined duration and mandate.

   • Preparing for general elections after the completion of security arrangements.

3. Humanitarian-Social Track:

   • Launching a national initiative for reconciliation and reconstruction with the participation of civil society and the Sudanese diaspora.

Conditions for the Success of Dialogue and Negotiation

• Mutual recognition by all parties of the necessity of a political settlement and the absence of an absolute victor.

• Neutralizing external interference as much as possible by directing international interests towards supporting stability and rejecting partisanship.

• Managing disagreements within and between institutions, rather than in the political street or the military field.

• Involving politically unaffiliated actors.

• Guaranteeing justice and accountability to avoid repeating the cycle of revenge.

Implementation Mechanisms and Guarantees

• Agreed-upon regional sponsorship.

• International guarantees.

• A high-level national committee to follow up on implementation, comprising representatives from the army, the RSF, political forces, and civil society.

• A binding timeline for ending the transitional phase and conducting elections.

Conclusion

The war in Sudan will not end through attrition or sanctions, but through a realistic balancing of interests that leads to a single table. The desired negotiation project is not a victory for one party over another, but a victory for the state over chaos.

Building a genuine map for political dialogue begins with recognizing that all parties—despite their differences—have become hostages to the war itself, and that peace is no longer merely a moral choice, but an existential necessity.

 

 

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