One Month into a War “We Didn’t Expect”

It has been one month since the joint U.S.-Israeli aggression against Iran on February 28, 2026 a campaign launched with overwhelming force. Yet today, both Washington and Tel Aviv seem to be living through a kind of disappointment regarding their own power. At the same time, they do not hide their astonishment at Iran’s performance, its ability to withstand, to continue the war, and at certain moments, even to influence its course.

Trump: “We Didn’t Expect This Much”

Here in Turkey, we have a saying: “Get the news from a child.” Because a child speaks without calculation or planning, and thus reveals the truth.

In this situation, we could say: “Get the news from Trump.” Not because he possesses a child’s innocence, but because he talks excessively and impulsively, without restraint. At times whether boasting, showing off, or even complaining he reveals state secrets, knowledge, unconscious and conscious thoughts. That’s his well-known style.

And indeed, amid his torrent of words, we have already heard confessions to that effect: We didn’t expect this much neither from Iran nor from ourselves.

It seems there is still much they haven’t anticipated. But let’s not exaggerate; perhaps there are also things we ourselves haven’t expected.

So far, we have failed to understand the logic behind this U.S.-Israeli aggression. With each step, new information, different outcomes, and conflicting calculations emerge.

For example: Was the closure of the Strait of Hormuz following the escalation in Venezuela unexpected? Or was it a calculated move all along, aimed at cutting off China’s oil supplies? If so, was the real target behind the attacks on Venezuela and Iran actually China?

And if that is the case, what is Israel doing in this war? Are its theological-political Zionist ambitions merely a tool in America’s rivalry with China?

These are serious questions, of course. They are not the kind that can be resolved by adopting a single theory and clinging to it dogmatically. At every stage, new developments can put any theory to the test. This is a story of a stone thrown by a gambler one that a hundred wise men cannot retrieve.

Military Calculations and the Resistance of Reality

Washington entered this war following Netanyahu’s playbook, initially presented as a logical, preemptive military strike. But where we stand today increasingly suggests it may have been a major strategic blunder.

The core assumption at the start was that strikes targeting top leadership would quickly paralyze Iran’s military decision-making, trigger panic and collapse within the system, and that intensive airstrikes would cripple Iran’s missile and drone capabilities within weeks.

Yet what is emerging now is that these goals have been achieved only to a limited extent. According to various intelligence estimates, only about a third of Iran’s missile and drone stockpiles have been completely destroyed. A significant portion remains either damaged, hidden, or relocated to underground facilities.

This indicates that initial military planning underestimated the distributed, flexible nature of Iran’s buried military infrastructure.

As for Iran’s responses, it is hard to say Washington and Tel Aviv anticipated all outcomes. Iran’s ability to retaliate has not been fully paralyzed. On the contrary, the longer the war drags on, the more effectively Iran can use its tools of “asymmetric expansion.” Pressure on Gulf infrastructure, military bases, and maritime trade routes has been a clear example.

Moreover, the Houthis in Yemen have effectively entered the battlefield, proving that the conflict will not remain confined to the Iran-Israel-U.S. triangle. It could spread to the Red Sea and Bab el-Mandeb. This expansion is one of the most significant unforeseen developments, multiplying the war’s costs.

If a war begins with the goal of paralyzing an adversary’s central capability, but instead opens new fronts and creates additional pressure points, then any claim of military success must be seriously questioned.

So, how much have the U.S.-Israeli strikes including the assassination of top leaders weakened Iran’s military capacity?

An honest answer would be: significantly, but not decisively.

The strikes on leadership and strategic decision-making centers caused a major shock, especially in the first weeks. Field monitoring and reports from inside Iran indicate substantial casualties, widespread infrastructure damage, and pressure on governance mechanisms. Yet the same data shows that the system has not collapsed. Iran has organized large pro-regime demonstrations, the state apparatus has not eroded despite losing some commanders, and there has been no major internal meltdown.

Thus, any expectation of reaching “the threshold of regime change” appears to have largely evaporated. Israel and the United States have hit Iran hard but they have not paralyzed it.

The political consequences are even more important. Iran’s reactions toward the Gulf and its broader neighborhood could deepen a new, long-term crisis of trust.

On one hand, Gulf states fear Iran may become more aggressive under the pressure of war. On the other hand, they worry their own territory and energy infrastructure could become direct targets in the context of the U.S.-Israeli campaign. These dual risks are pushing Gulf capitals to adopt balanced positions, to avoid being dragged into or expanding the conflict.

In this context, the new diplomatic movement involving Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Egypt, and Pakistan stems from this shared sense of exposure. The search for a framework—not based on fully encircling Iran, but on managing the war within controllable boundaries has become increasingly clear.

That is why the four-way dialogue platform to be hosted by Pakistan is especially significant. It can be seen as an attempt to build a regional crisis-management mechanism, as an alternative to the traditional Western-dominated security order.

The Energy Shock and Washington’s Limits of Endurance

On the economic front, the question is straightforward: How long can the global economy withstand this “major energy shock” resulting from the closure of the Strait of Hormuz and rising oil prices?

The short answer: It can hold on for a while, but the costs add up fast.

The Strait of Hormuz handles roughly one-fifth of global oil flows. Any prolonged disruption doesn’t just raise oil prices it also drives up the cost of liquefied natural gas, fertilizers, shipping, and insurance.

In the United States, with gasoline prices approaching the psychological threshold of $4 per gallon, coupled with immense pressure on the transport sector due to rising diesel prices, the shock has reached consumers directly.

Federal Reserve officials have warned that the war could hurt inflation expectations and the job market. This means the war is no longer just a regional crisis; it has become a factor amplifying global recession risks.

Here lies Washington’s domestic political breaking point. U.S. administrations can justify foreign wars with rhetoric about global security and deterrence, but voters measure things by what they pay at the pump.

Sustained energy price increases, accelerating inflation, and cascading transport costs all add pressure on the White House especially since lower- and middle-income groups are highly sensitive to energy prices.

Thus, the domestic economic breaking point is just as important as the military one. If the effective closure of the Strait of Hormuz continues and prices keep rising for months, the war’s domestic legitimacy will begin to erode no matter its partial military successes.

Turkey’s Strategy: Preventing Sectarian War and Containing Expansion

Amid this landscape, Turkey is taking a different path. Ankara’s primary goal is to prevent the war from morphing into a sectarian conflict, to work for de-escalation, and to build regional security based on consultation among Islamic nations.

Turkey rejects reshaping the region according to Israel’s vision and opposes uncontrolled war expansion by Iran. As Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan has stressed, regional coordination is needed to confront Israel’s strategy of dragging Islamic countries into a prolonged conflict.

Within this framework, the new diplomatic line bringing together Turkey, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Pakistan hosted in Islamabad reflects this need. It is not a military alliance, but rather an approach based on crisis management, mediation, energy security, and opening regional dialogue channels. The goal is not to create a new war axis but to build a “four-way balancing mechanism” that prevents the war from widening.

Conclusion: A Month In

Now, one month into this war, it can be said that Washington by following Netanyahu’s strategy built its calculations on overoptimistic military expectations and an underestimation of political and economic costs.

Iran has taken heavy blows but has not collapsed. The war has not remained contained. The energy shock has become a global economic pressure. And regional powers are beginning to explore new diplomatic paths.

Therefore, if the war started with a “short and decisive” logic, the reality we are living today is one of a long, sprawling, and increasingly costly conflict.

From now on, the question is no longer: Who struck harder?

It is: Who can stop this fire before it turns into a full-scale regional meltdown?

 

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