Proxy Warfare and Its Consequences: Lessons Learned

Proxy warfare, the deliberate cultivation of non-state insurgent actors as instruments of state policy, is neither legitimate nor sustainable. Pakistan’s experience in Afghanistan offers a stark illustration: what was intended as a tool of influence instead produced chronic instability, fueled radicalization, and triggered severe regional blowback. Militancy that was meant to be a controllable instrument evolved into an autonomous force, undermining not only Afghanistan’s stability but also Pakistan’s own security calculus. The consequences extend beyond borders, affecting neighboring states and contributing to cycles of violence and mistrust that persist decades later. The lessons are clear: relying on proxies as instruments of power carries inherent risks that can spiral beyond any government’s control, and no actor seeking long-term security or legitimacy should replicate such a strategy.

Pakistan’s engagement with militancy-oriented groups was initially conceived as a tool for strategic leverage. Over time, however, these relationships evolved from tactical instruments into structural constraints. Networks meant to enhance influence became independent centers of power, generating internal insecurity, reputational damage, and uncontrollable violence. Disengagement was never simple; it became politically and strategically costly. Proxy actors rarely remain controllable, and states that rely on them often pay a long-term price for these decisions.

Yet today, Pakistan expects a Taliban-led government, operating amid economic collapse, international isolation, fragile institutions, and a far less disciplined military, to act decisively and accomplish what Islamabad, with its nuclear arsenal, professional army, and decades of intelligence experience, could not. Such expectations are not only unrealistic; they reveal a willingness to offload responsibility while evading accountability. Despite being critically opposed to the Taliban-led Afghan government’s internal and external policies, I consider these demands to be less about genuine security concerns and more about shifting proxy responsibility. Networks that resisted control under a far more capable state cannot be dismantled easily by a weaker one.

Afghanistan’s current rulers face constraints shaped by both history and structure. Many of the actors they are urged to confront emerged from the ideological and conflict environment that produced the present order. Networks forged through decades of war, shared ideology, and cross-border dependency cannot be dissolved by decree without risking internal rupture in a fragile political landscape. What is often interpreted as reluctance is more accurately a deliberate strategy to preserve internal cohesion and prevent further fragmentation.

History reinforces these limitations. No Afghan government has ever exercised full control over all armed actors within its territory. Geography, social fragmentation, cross-Durand Line sanctuaries, and external patronage have consistently constrained centralized authority. The current administration, lacking economic stability and international recognition, is particularly cautious about provoking internal fractures or driving marginalized fighters into open rebellion. Expectations of rapid, centralized enforcement overstate the Afghan government’s capacity and may underestimate the presence of militant networks that may or may not still operate within Afghanistan.

Pakistan’s record remains central to understanding this dilemma. Instead of containing insurgency, Islamabad systematically promoted, protected, and incentivized militant actors, clearly declaring and openly treating them as strategic assets rather than long-term threats. This approach destabilized Afghanistan and transformed militancy into a transnational challenge that now escapes unilateral control. Networks once nurtured as instruments of influence have become sources of instability, demonstrating that strategic gains from proxies are temporary, while long-term costs are profound.

Against this backdrop, calls from Pakistani clerical and political circles for the Taliban-led government to “control insurgency” or punish alleged Afghan supporters of the TTP ring hollow. Such rhetoric ignores the structural failures of Pakistan’s own security doctrine and seeks absolution without accountability. A state that could not dismantle its proxy ecosystem, despite receiving massive financial support from the West and enjoying overwhelming military and intelligence advantages, cannot credibly expect an economically devastated and internationally isolated Afghanistan to succeed where it failed. This power imbalance allows one state to dictate terms to a weaker neighbor, masking its own failures under the guise of security concerns rather than reflecting genuine interest in regional stability.

The lesson is clear: proxy warfare does not produce security; it corrodes it. Any attempt to revive or normalize this model, whether by Pakistan or any other actor, risks repeating failures whose costs are already evident across the region. Sustainable stability will require abandoning proxy logic entirely, confronting insurgency as a shared regional responsibility, and ensuring political accountability takes precedence over convenient strategic calculations.

From my perspective, Pakistan’s insistence on demanding outcomes it never achieved is both an attempt to hide its own policy failures and a strategy with dangerous consequences. To expect the Taliban-led government to accomplish what Pakistan itself could not is not merely unrealistic; it is a deliberate act of moral posturing at Afghanistan’s expense. Real regional stability will only come when states acknowledge their historical responsibilities, confront insurgency without shortcuts, and abandon the flawed logic of proxies. Until that happens, the cycle of conflict, mistrust, and instability will continue, leaving Afghanistan trapped in the consequences of decisions made far beyond its borders.

 

 

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