The Rivalry Between Turkey and Israel Evolving into Competing Blocs and Alliances

The war of annihilation in Gaza, following the “Al-Aqsa Flood” operation and its regional repercussions, has placed Turkey and Israel in a state of rivalry and indirect confrontation, particularly in Syria. However, recent moves by both sides point to the beginnings of them forming competing and potentially confrontational blocs and alliances.

Indirect Confrontation

The “Al-Aqsa Flood” operation in 2023 occurred amidst an ongoing improvement in Turkish-Israeli relations, just weeks after President Erdogan met Prime Minister Netanyahu at the “Turkish House” in New York on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly meetings, and roughly a year after the two countries restored diplomatic ties.

However, Ankara’s subsequent stance, which evolved across political, economic, and legal fronts against Israel—including participating in the “genocide” case at the International Court of Justice and announcing a halt to trade dealings—made Turkey a target for Israeli criticism and direct incitement.

As Israel’s war expanded toward Lebanon, Erdogan stated that “Israeli forces are two hours away from our borders,” and the Turkish parliament convened to discuss ways to counter the Israeli threat. Ankara also viewed the war on Iran through the lens of self-preservation, and the practical steps it adopted can be read as fortifying itself against any potential Israeli aggression. Furthermore, according to Israeli narratives, Israeli airstrikes in Syria at certain points included targeting Turkish assets, ranging from potential military bases to deployed listening devices.

When Erdogan spoke of the necessity to enhance Turkey’s power “so that Israel cannot do what it does to the Palestinians,” reminding the audience of his country’s role in Libya and Karabakh, then-Foreign Minister Israel Katz threatened him with “the fate of Saddam Hussein.” Concurrently, the Israeli “Nagel Committee” recommended preparing for a potential military confrontation with Turkey “within years.”

Conversely, official Turkish statements consistently place sole responsibility on Israel for threatening security and stability in the region, pointing to its role in threatening Syria through direct aggression and support for internal actors like the “Hajri” (likely referring to Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham or similar factions) and the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF).

While Netanyahu’s government has repeatedly declared support for the SDF against Turkey, Ankara interprets the SDF’s stalling in the process of integration into the Syrian army as betting on continued Israeli support. Given Ankara’s insistence on the necessity to dissolve the SDF and integrate it into the official military institution, while hinting at direct military solutions or support for Damascus, the Israeli role remains a key consideration in terms of challenges and complicating the landscape.

Recently, Ankara announced its desire to participate in the proposed “International Stability Force” meant to deploy in Gaza as part of the Trump plan—a move supported by Trump but vehemently rejected by Israel “due to Erdogan’s longstanding hostility,” according to its Foreign Minister Gideon Sa’ar.

Confrontational Summits

In a striking coincidence on December 22nd, two opposing summits took place simultaneously. A tripartite summit between Israel, Greece, and (Greek) Cyprus was held in occupied Jerusalem at the same time a high-level Turkish delegation visited the Syrian capital, Damascus.

In occupied Jerusalem, Netanyahu met with Greek Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis and Cypriot President Nikos Christodoulides to discuss “sensitive regional files” and enhance military and security cooperation in light of “real threats facing the region,” according to the occupation prime minister.

The tripartite summit carried several clear signals of its primary focus on confronting Ankara. Most notably, it announced the deployment of long-range “Spike” anti-tank missile systems—purchased from Israel—to Greek army ground forces serving on Aegean islands (which are disputed with Turkey). It also announced the formation of a “Joint Rapid Intervention Force” of 2,500 troops from the three parties “to protect vital infrastructure in the Eastern Mediterranean,” the main recent area of dispute between Greece and Turkey. Netanyahu’s declaration to “those who dream of empires and controlling our lands”—referring to Erdogan without naming him—that “forget it, this won’t happen,” was another pointed message.

Simultaneously, a Turkish delegation including Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan, Defense Minister Yaşar Güler, and intelligence chief İbrahim Kalın was meeting with Syrian President Bashar al-Assad and then with their Syrian counterparts within a “3+3” mechanism. The visit’s agenda prioritized files such as economic and trade cooperation in the context of lifting US sanctions on Damascus, enhancing security and military coordination and cooperation, and the return of Syrian refugees.

Although the file of integrating the SDF into the Syrian military institution was a top priority for Ankara, the joint press conference between Fidan and his Syrian counterpart, Faisal Mekdad, did not omit clear references to Israel, particularly from Fidan. He emphasized that the two sides discussed “repeated Israeli attacks on Syrian territory,” calling on Israel to “abandon its expansionist policies to ensure the stability of Syria and the region as a whole.”

Confrontation?

Despite both Damascus and Ankara’s keen efforts to avoid direct confrontation with Israel, at least for the time being, the latter is escalating its position in a way that raises serious concerns about such a confrontation occurring.

From a certain perspective, Turkey has not responded practically or on the ground to any Israeli targeting of its—role, influence, and presence—in Syria, viewing strengthening Syria’s power and stability as the optimal response for now.

Moreover, Ankara has supported the path of talks and then negotiations between Syria and Israel. Fidan expressed hope during the aforementioned press conference that “the ongoing talks will lead to a result,” stressing that “progress in them is of utmost importance for the stability of Syria and the region.”

In contrast, official and unofficial statements from Israel place Turkey at the center of incitement and targeting. The new security doctrine after the “Al-Aqsa Flood” dictates that Israel should not wait for threats to materialize before dealing with them, but rather nip any potential threat in the bud. Furthermore, its weakening of a number of its enemies in the region—without conclusively ending the war against them—has made Turkey a potential future adversary, seen as a strong and competing state.

There are also growing assessments of a potential resumption of war on Lebanon and/or Iran or other actors in the region to “complete the mission,” amidst the “war budget” Netanyahu’s government is seeking for 2026, especially as it will be an election year marked by bids to win votes from an increasingly extremist Israeli society.

While Israel views Turkey as the biggest beneficiary in Syria and anticipates a potential Turkish military presence in Gaza—which could mean “encircling” Israel from the north and south—it seeks to contain Ankara and weaken it through various means, including supporting the SDF and others in Syria, and forming blocs targeting Turkey.

Israel was a primary and active driver in establishing the “East Mediterranean Gas Forum” in 2019, whose main unstated goal was to isolate Ankara and deprive it of its rights in the Eastern Mediterranean, despite ironically having the longest coastline on it.

Today, as Ankara develops its Arab relations and calms tensions with the European Union, Netanyahu’s government is turning to Ankara’s “traditional and permanent enemy,” Athens. The outputs of the tripartite summit, particularly the “Joint Rapid Intervention Force,” can only be understood as a threatening message to Ankara on both the political and potentially the direct military field levels.

Does this mean 2026 will witness a direct military confrontation between Turkey and Israel?

No, not necessarily. There are real constraints on this scenario, foremost among them being the significant military capabilities of both sides and the consequently heavy losses a confrontation would entail for both. The American factor, which opposes wars between allies, is another key restraint, especially since it also involves Athens, which shares NATO membership with both Ankara and Washington.

The US administration is seeking to de-escalate tensions between Turkey and Israel. Its ambassador in Ankara, Jeff Flake, has spoken of the possibility of the two sides reaching economic understandings that could improve relations, but this remains distant for now.

Therefore, based on current indicators, the scenario of indirect confrontation remains the most likely. We are essentially talking about a potential indirect confrontation in Syria, where explosive elements are densely concentrated—from repeated and prolonged Israeli attacks to the SDF file, which might involve a military operation in which Netanyahu’s government could engage in one way or another.

As for direct confrontation, it remains a possibility in the long term rather than the near term, as long as there is no fundamental change in the American position, Israeli intentions, and the stances of various regional actors.

 

 

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