The region stretching from the Strait of Hormuz to the Red Sea (Bab el-Mandeb) is undergoing a profound strategic transformation. These maritime corridors are no longer mere routes for energy transport; they have become instruments of geopolitical pressure in a multi-layered conflict.
This shift is evident in the convergence of Iran’s direct role in the Gulf with Yemen’s indirect role (via the Houthi group) in the Red Sea.
The geostrategic significance of these chokepoints lies in the fact that the Strait of Hormuz and Bab el-Mandeb are essential nodes in the global economy. Approximately 20% of the world’s oil trade passes through the Strait of Hormuz, while Bab el-Mandeb connects the Red Sea to the Indian Ocean and directly impacts the Suez Canal. The interconnection between them means that tensions in one are likely to spill over into the other, forming what some analysts call “the chain of maritime strangulation stretching from the Gulf to the Mediterranean.”
Iran views these chokepoints as forward lines of defense. However, it has shifted to a more sophisticated strategy based on asymmetric deterrence, leveraging regional proxies and multiplex pressure simultaneously exerting pressure across multiple arenas.
Hormuz as a Direct Threat Tool
In the Gulf, Iran maintains a direct naval presence, coastal missiles, and tactical fast boats, granting it the capability to close or threaten navigation through the Strait of Hormuz in times of escalation.
The Red Sea as a Strategic Extension
Here lies the role of the Houthis: Iran supports the group to transfer the conflict from the Gulf to Bab el-Mandeb, creating a “dual strategic depth” that serves Tehran’s agenda in the Arab region and provides it with powerful negotiating leverage.
Today, the Houthis have become a naval actor in their own right. No longer merely a party to a civil war, they possess missile and drone capabilities—all under the direct supervision of Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) operatives based in Houthi-controlled areas of Yemen—and have increasingly targeted ships in the Red Sea.
These capabilities have allowed the Houthis to influence global trade. Bab el-Mandeb is often described as a soft underbelly of the international system. Western analysts note that Bab el-Mandeb is less fortified than Hormuz, and any threat there directly impacts Europe and Asia.
Thus, the Houthis are not viewed merely as a tool but as part of a distributed regional pressure network that enables Iran to deny direct responsibility while achieving the desired impact.
To understand the truth behind the Houthis’ recent threatening statements and precisely where they originated those familiar with the inner workings will undoubtedly recognize them as unmistakably Iranian in nature. In this context, the Houthis serve as little more than an Iranian echo and a launch pad for missiles and drones established by IRGC elements in Yemen. These statements come amid reciprocal escalation across various fronts of conflict and their associated tools.
They clearly signal that the next step may involve closing Bab el-Mandeb and targeting global trade routes through the Red Sea, should the U.S.-Israeli alliance move to occupy Iran’s Kharg Island and succeed in forcibly reopening maritime trade through the Strait of Hormuz. In short, this is a threat issued through the IRGC, directed at the region and the international community.
Anthony Cordesman of the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) points out that Iran largely manages the conflict through asymmetric warfare capabilities to compensate for its conventional military weaknesses. This explains its reliance on fast boats, naval mines, and regional proxies.
Kenneth Pollack of the American Enterprise Institute (AEI) adds that Iran does not seek to actually close the Strait of Hormuz but rather to maintain a perpetual threat that makes confrontation with it prohibitively costly. This reinforces the idea of the threat as a negotiating tool rather than an end goal.
If a battle for the Bab el-Mandeb Strait were to take place, it would represent an Iranian attempt to outflank the Gulf from the south, transforming the confrontation from one of “containing Iran” into a “multi-front defense.” This underscores the concept of “Arab maritime security,” with growing calls for the formation of an Arab naval force to secure the chokepoints independently of the West, linking the security of the Gulf with that of the Red Sea.
The West appears to approach threats to international waterways and global trade selectively, acting only when its direct interests are harmed.
Meanwhile, Iran is positioning itself as a regional expansionist power. Tehran pursues a strategy of “expansion through vacuums,” exploiting conditions in the Arab world to broaden its influence. Former Saudi intelligence chief Prince Turki Al-Faisal emphasizes that Gulf security cannot be separated from Red Sea security because the threat has become circular, not linear.
Kuwaiti intellectual Abdullah Al-Nafisi asserts that Iran has succeeded in building “strategic arms” that allow it to wage a prolonged conflict without direct confrontation—a concept consistent with proxy warfare.
The Houthis do not possess independent decision-making authority due to their ties to Iran. Analyst Maskel Knights notes that Tehran’s support is the decisive factor in their military capability.
Iranian-American scholar Vali Nasr, author of The Grand Strategy of Iran: A Political History, argues that Tehran uses the chokepoints as leverage, not as suicidal weapons. Conversely, some Gulf observers warn that the threat could become reality amid full-scale escalation, even if Iran does not desire a comprehensive war.
In a broader context, former U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger concluded that control over energy routes consistently provides a central element of global power. This explains why Hormuz and Bab el-Mandeb have become more than mere geographic points—they are keys to the international order itself.
According to Iran’s doctrine of “calculated escalation,” it does not seek to physically close the straits but uses the threat of closing the Strait of Hormuz as a bargaining chip.
Current military operations constitute a form of hybrid warfare, combining proxies (the Houthis), cyberattacks, and limited naval threats. This mosaic raises concerns about the multiplication of chokepoints. Western analysis focuses on the real danger: simultaneous threats at both Hormuz and Bab el-Mandeb, which could trigger a global energy crisis.
The true risk lies not in closing any single chokepoint but in disrupting several at once. This aligns with the linkage between Hormuz and Bab el-Mandeb and Iran’s expansion of pressure through Yemen.
Maritime security researcher James Holmes notes that non-state actors equipped with relatively low-cost capabilities can cause major disruptions to global shipping—a reality that applies perfectly to the Houthis, who deploy drones and missiles at low cost. A report by the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) highlights that the Houthi threat to navigation represents a qualitative shift in naval warfare, where states are no longer the sole primary actors.
Some Western policymakers acknowledge the relative decline of U.S. naval dominance, the difficulty of managing a multi-front conflict, the gravity of a chokepoint war, Iran’s central role, and the risk of the conflict expanding to include other parties with divergent political and military agendas.
The Iranian role can be understood politically and militarily through three concentric circles:
Geopolitical: A struggle for influence among Iran, the West, and the Gulf Arab states.
Military: An indirect war waged through proxies and chokepoints.
Economic: Control over energy flows and global trade.
Thus, the battle for the straits is no longer a conventional naval confrontation but a complex form of conflict where geopolitics, economics, and military doctrine intersect—all with profound implications for the global economy. The Houthi-Iranian coordination stands as one of the most prominent manifestations of this complexity, turning chokepoints into simultaneous tools of negotiation and arenas of deterrence.
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