Uncertain Fate for Syria’s “March 10” Agreement Between Al-Sharaa and Abdi

Beirut – Mounting questions surround the fate of the March 10, 2024 agreement, signed by Syrian President Ahmad Al-Sharaa and Mazloum Abdi, commander of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), as the deadline for implementing its terms approaches at the end of this year. This uncertainty is amplified by recent clashes in northeastern Syria, reigniting fears that the accord may slide toward greater complexity or outright collapse.

The questions extend to potential scenarios and the future of negotiations between the interim Syrian government and Kurdish political and military forces regarding the integration of the SDF and the civilian administrations controlling the Al-Jazeera region (northeastern Syria) into Syrian state institutions. They also touch upon the role of the U.S. administration, which pushed for the deal, and the positions of regional states, particularly Turkey. Ankara is closely monitoring the fate and manner of the agreement’s implementation, amid warnings about the dangers of continued stalling and exceeding the established timelines.

Mounting Tensions and the Threat of Escalation

The current reality suggests that the procrastination and delay in implementing the agreement cannot persist indefinitely. Such stalling may push regional powers, especially Turkey, to conduct military operations to impose changes on the ground. Failure to implement the deal threatens to ignite an armed confrontation—an outcome no one in Syria desires, as it would plunge the country into a bloody spiral, hindering its emergence from the catastrophic conditions caused by the war waged by the Assad regime against the Syrian people over 14 years. Such a conflict could also draw in Turkey, whose officials have threatened intervention against Kurdish fighters they deem terrorists threatening their national security.

Despite initial regional and international welcome and U.S. mediation and sponsorship, the agreement has faced significant challenges, manifested in implementation delays and increasing field clashes and tensions. Several rounds of negotiations were held over the past months between Syrian government officials and Kurdish delegations, but they failed to yield tangible progress on applying its core provisions. This has led some Syrian officials to accuse the SDF of stalling and negligence in implementation, matched by similar criticisms from SDF leaders and the forces controlling northeastern Syria.

Notably, the Syrian Democratic Council (SDC) recently refused, in its latest statement, to link the agreement’s application to binding timeframes—a move seen as escalating the debate over its implementation. This is despite the agreement’s eighth article explicitly stating that “the executive committees shall undertake the implementation of the agreement no later than the end of this year.”

Divergent Positions: A Core Problem

In the absence of any real progress on political and military levels, the Syrian government awaits the Kurdish forces’ stance on a recent proposal. This proposal calls for reorganizing the approximately 50,000 SDF fighters into three main divisions and smaller brigades, provided they relinquish some command chains and open their controlled areas to other Syrian army units.

The core issue lies in the conflicting positions between the Syrian government and the forces controlling northeastern Syria, especially regarding the future of the Syrian state and the nature of governance—centering on questions of centralization versus decentralization. The Syrian government seeks full institutional integration, reorganizing institutions under the principle of central sovereignty while granting administrative decentralization to the residents of those areas. In contrast, the Kurdish forces propose a model akin to resettling all their military and civilian outputs within a decentralized state, ensuring (especially for the SDF) that they remain as a single bloc within the Syrian state without becoming an organic part of it.

This has led some Syrian officials to argue that what the Kurdish parties want is to legitimize the status quo since 2013—when the Kurdish Democratic Union Party (PYD) took control of those areas. This clash in positions and visions has left both the Syrian government and Kurdish forces in unproductive negotiations, lacking common ground or a shared political reference point, resulting in numerous rounds of talks without significant progress.

The commitment declared by both the SDF and SDC to the principle of integration into the Syrian state is tied to a fundamental condition: preserving the SDF’s military organizational structure and combat role, alongside maintaining the structure of the “Autonomous Administration” and all existing institutions. Conversely, the Syrian authorities seek to extend state sovereignty over all its territories and monopolize weapons. Furthermore, their control over the Al-Jazeera provinces means securing control over natural resources like oil, gas, and water. For the Kurdish political forces, this signifies the end of their self-governing or decentralized project.

Reasons for the Stalling

The Syrian administration desires to entrench its political system in the country—an aspiration aligned with the interests of some active regional and global powers. However, its options to achieve this are limited, revolving around dialogue and negotiation. Thus, the political and military leadership of the forces controlling northeastern Syria rely on a fundamental loophole in the March 10 agreement: its implementation is tied to negotiations between the two parties. This distances the undesirable military option, both for Syria and internationally, especially after both sides accepted a U.S.-driven ceasefire last April. However, conversely, stalling and procrastination have prevented the agreement’s execution.

The reasons for the stalling can be summarized as follows:

1. The Kurdish leaders of the PYD, its civilian output the SDC, and its military wing the People’s Protection Units (YPG)—which form the backbone of the SDF—are unwilling to relinquish the gains and wealth accumulated during their years of control over northeastern Syria. They have monopolized revenues from oil and gas fields, water resources, vast agricultural lands, and commercial border crossings with Iraq, in addition to forming a military force supported by the U.S.-led international coalition to fight ISIS. Integration into the Syrian body means surrendering all these gains and resources to the Syrian state.

2. Kurdish leaders, especially those from the Turkish Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), reject dissolving the SDF. They believe that merging it as demanded by the Syrian authorities would mean the end of their role and their departure from the Syrian arena.

3. Kurdish political and military leaders adopt an approach skeptical of Syria’s new leaders, betting on the fragility of the new Syrian administration with its military composition and considering it an unreliable partner from the start. They also attempt to leverage external support and exploit the confusion that struck the Syrian administration after the violations during the events in the Syrian coast and Suwayda city.

4. These leaders aim to preserve their status by solidifying the SDF’s independent position within the new Syrian army and extracting recognition for northeastern Syria as a political and administrative unit within an expanded decentralized system.

Possible Scenarios

Given the current circumstances and the passing of the period granted to implement the March 10 agreement, several possible scenarios can be outlined:

1. Scenario One: Gradual, Limited Steps. This involves reaching limited, incremental steps to implement some agreement provisions, such as the gradual handover of SDF-controlled areas starting with Deir ez-Zor province and its oil fields, completing the Aleppo agreement regarding the Ashrafiyah and Sheikh Maqsoud neighborhoods, agreeing on forming joint military units composed of SDF and Syrian army elements, and appointing SDF commanders to positions in the Syrian Defense Ministry. In return, institutions of the “Autonomous Administration” would be granted local powers within an expanded administrative decentralized system. Leaks suggest such a scenario enjoys U.S. support and is considered realistic by U.S. Special Envoy Thomas Barak.

2. Scenario Two: Maintaining the Status Quo. This means continued stagnation, preserving the lack of escalation and reducing tensions while awaiting regional and international understandings, especially between Ankara and the SDF, as well as between Damascus and Tel Aviv—a direction the United States is pushing towards.

3. Scenario Three: The Worst-Case Scenario. This results from the collapse and failure of negotiations, opening the door to fighting between government forces and the SDF. This is considered the least likely scenario, given President Al-Sharaa’s emphasis that military force will not be used to extend state control over all Syrian areas, and the United States is making strenuous efforts to prevent it.

Finally, what Syrians hope for is the realization of the most positive scenario: the gradual implementation of the agreement’s terms, leading to the integration of SDF forces into the Syrian army and the return of the Al-Jazeera region to the Syrian fold, fulfilling the desire of the majority of its Arab and Kurdish inhabitants.

Undoubtedly, achieving such a scenario requires mutual concessions and reaching middle-ground solutions regarding integration and completing Syrian territorial unity. It remains imperative for the Syrian authorities to take steps to involve Kurds and other Syrian components in all aspects of governance, so that all Syrians feel they have a stake in rebuilding their homeland.

 

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