The hosting of Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan by U.S. President Donald Trump at the White House marked a significant resumption of presidential-level relations between the two nations, a dynamic that had been notably absent during the Biden administration.
Despite high expectations, the immediate outcomes of the summit underscored both positive intentions and the persistent institutional hurdles that remain.
Context and Expectations
The Trump-Erdoğan summit in Washington was the first of its kind in six years, dating back to Trump’s first term. The previous president, Joe Biden, had never concealed his personal animosity toward Erdoğan, having gone so far as to call during his election campaign for “supporting the Turkish opposition to unseat him.”
This meeting took place against a backdrop of regionally and internationally significant events: the ongoing Russia-Ukraine war, in which Trump has recently attempted to mediate a ceasefire while also pledging support for Kyiv; the changing political landscape in Syria, where both countries converge on supporting the new leadership—or, at a minimum, “giving it a chance,” in American parlance; and the two-year-long war of annihilation in Gaza.
The personal relationship between the two presidents has always been a crucial facet of Ankara-Washington relations during Trump’s tenure. Trump makes no secret of his admiration for his Turkish counterpart, whom he sees as “a strong man who commands wide respect in Turkey, Europe, and the world.”
Conversely, the Turkish presidency appears to have thoroughly studied the keys to the American president’s personality—a leader many of his peers are wary of meeting due to his mercurial temperament, his fondness for personal praise, and his focus on transactional gains. In this context, Erdoğan repeatedly expressed his “confidence in Trump” as a president capable of stopping the wars in Ukraine and Gaza. Furthermore, just before his trip to the U.S., Erdoğan lifted retaliatory tariffs his country had imposed on some American goods in 2018, a move originally made in response to U.S. tariffs on steel and aluminum imports.
Preceding the bilateral summit, Erdoğan delivered a speech at the UN General Assembly, where he launched a sharp critique of Israel and Prime Minister Netanyahu over the war in Gaza. He also met with Trump and several Arab officials to discuss the conflict, during which Trump suggested a ceasefire agreement was imminent.
The summit’s agenda was expected to cover a range of critical bilateral and shared-interest issues. These included the Russia-Ukraine war, the war in Gaza, trade and economic relations, the Syrian file, regional escalation, potential deals for F-16 and F-35 fighter jets, nuclear energy cooperation, the fate of the S-400 defense system Ankara purchased from Moscow, and the issue of Russian gas imports.
President Erdoğan received a notably warm and celebratory welcome at the White House. Trump repeatedly expressed his admiration for Erdoğan as a strong president with whom he shares an “old friendship,” and he credited the Turkish leader’s role in the change of leadership in Syria, implying, “He’s the one who got it done.”
Responding to journalists’ questions, the American president also hinted that the U.S. would lift sanctions on Turkey and finalize arms deals “immediately, if we have a positive meeting,” stating that Erdoğan would “successfully buy whatever he wants.”
Outcomes
In both tone and substance, the presidential summit was highly positive, particularly regarding the direct rapport between Trump and Erdoğan—a stark contrast to some of Trump’s more strained meetings with other world leaders, including America’s closest allies. Trump’s own statements significantly raised expectations for the summit, especially concerning long-standing, thorny issues between the two nations, such as the F-35 program, from which Turkey was expelled by a U.S. decision following its purchase of the Russian S-400 defense system.
The most concrete direct outcome was the signing of a cooperation agreement to establish a nuclear reactor for electricity production in Turkey, serving as a cornerstone for a strategic partnership in peaceful nuclear energy. Reports also circulated of understandings regarding Ankara’s purchase of a large number of Boeing aircraft in a deal worth tens of billions of dollars. However, concerning other defense industry matters and specific arms deals, neither side announced definitive results.
Overall, it is clear that both parties built the meeting on a foundation of shared interests, particularly economic and commercial ones, rather than on pre-existing political positions or contentious dossiers. This approach promises the potential for a new chapter in bilateral relations, which, despite their formal alliance, have been marred in recent years by several crises. These include Turkey’s removal from the F-35 program, sanctions imposed under the CAATSA law, the U.S. prosecution of the Turkish Halkbank, and persistent disagreements over Syria.
Regarding Ankara’s request to purchase 40 F-16 fighter jets, the matter appears to be on the negotiating table, given the deal’s financial benefits for the United States. The Biden administration had already approved the sale in principle after Turkey lifted its veto on Sweden’s NATO membership. Nevertheless, President Trump seemed to attach a condition, qualifying his statement with “if we have a positive meeting.” This was widely interpreted as a demand for Turkey to reduce or halt its imports of Russian natural gas to contribute to Western sanctions and pressure—a step Turkey is currently unable, and likely unwilling, to take in the foreseeable future due to long-term supply contracts and a desire not to upset relations with Moscow.
As for rejoining the F-35 project, the obstacles are far more complex. The first is the need for Congressional approval, which appears nearly impossible given the generally negative view of Turkey and Erdoğan on Capitol Hill. The second obstacle is the intense pressure from influential lobbies, particularly the Greek and Israeli lobbies, which are vehemently opposed to Turkey’s readmission. They seek to prevent Turkey from achieving military parity (or superiority, in Greece’s case) and to maintain Israel’s qualitative air superiority. The third obstacle remains the original reason for Turkey’s expulsion: the Russian S-400 system. Turkey still possesses the system, even if it has not been activated, necessitating a compromise to bridge the gap between the U.S., which demands the system’s removal or inspection, and Turkey, which offers a scenario of “non-activation.”
Conclusion and Future Prospects
In summary, there is a clear desire from both Trump and Erdoğan to set their countries’ relationship on a new track, one that avoids the shadows of past negative episodes, particularly sanctions and arms embargoes. The U.S. Ambassador to Ankara, Tom Bruck, indicated that Trump has decided to end the contradiction of being a formal ally of Turkey while simultaneously maintaining a relationship strained by disagreements and sanctions.
While the personal factor between the two presidents is central to this new beginning, tangible results are largely contingent on institutional and bureaucratic factors in the U.S., especially the stance of Congress. This is particularly true given the clear divergence in positions between the two countries—and the two presidents—regarding the war in Gaza and relations with Russia.
This institutional dimension is critically important as Ankara, while seeking closer ties with the West, reinforcing its NATO role, and renewing its bid for EU membership, does not want this to entail a break or confrontation with Moscow. Instead, it aims to diversify its relationships and foreign policy axes—a strategy that, in its current form, is unlikely to please the U.S. Congress.
This leaves the ball in the court of Trump’s personal and direct efforts to influence Congressional attitudes on one hand, and the potential for a shift in the composition and perspective of Congress itself on the other. Consequently, the Trump-Erdoğan summit represents a positive trajectory strongly supported by both leaders, but it remains a path under practical probation in the coming weeks and months. To this end, both sides have agreed to establish joint committees to follow up on the various tracks of cooperation between the two countries.
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