A Perennial Charade

And do not overlay the truth with falsehood, and do not knowingly suppress the truth…al Quran, Sura 2:42

Kabul:  On 9 September, a national holiday in Afghanistan, festivities erupted commemorating the life and history of Ahmad Shah Massoud, internationally acclaimed guerrilla commander.  Among the reverential, presidential hopeful Abdullah Abdullah it was said was moved to tears in a transparent display of political theatre and expediency.

Thanks to the efforts of the nihilist media and Britain’s intelligence service, BBC and MI6 respectively, ever-yet resentful over their nineteenth century thrashing at the hands of the Pashtun tribes, the person of Ahmad Shah Massoud was and continues to be anointed with virtual sainthood as an affront to the majority Pashtuns and in support of the malleable minority with whom they could more easily mold to their diktate.  This meddling legion of ideological leftist hagiographers in tandem with the aforementioned institutionalized propagandists, continue to revise historical fact into fantasy.

This is classic historical revisionism choreographed by Madison Avenue genius and keen political spinology, the media, romanced by the narrative, bereft of fact and ethical journalism, enabled this virtually messianic, saint-worship time and again.  Yet, as with the amoral hagiographers engaged in resuscitating  the legacies of war criminals, George W. Bush and Britain’s Tony Blair, self-styled, nihilistic  scribes who create fiction with which to resurrect the sordid histories of the  world’s worst, is seen by a majority of the Afghan people as panegyric-hyperbole.

But thanks to Soviet military historians, many of whom were personal friends of Massoud, we have, over the decades, come to know the truth about the mythological hero.  Contrary to the distorted, tortured history of the hagiographers, in truth, Massoud collaborated with the Soviets from early in 1980 through the entire jihad period and beyond.  Those interested in expanding research on this topic now have a treasure trove of material to be found in the memoirs of former Soviet high-ranking military officers and officials.  Outstanding sources are General Boris Gromov’s Limited Contingent, Leonid Shebarshin’s,  The Hand of Moscow, and perhaps most notably, four outstanding books by General A.A. Liakhovskii.

Alexandre Liakhovskii rose to the rank of Major General in the Soviet Army and in retirement became the leading Russian authority on the Soviet War in Afghanistan. During the war, he worked in the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces, and in 1987-89 served as personal aide to General of the Army Valentin Varennikov, head of the USSR Defense Ministry Operations Group in Afghanistan and President Najibullah’s top military adviser. General Liakhovskii’s position afforded him with unique insight into Soviet military decision-making and operation in Afghanistan. During his tenure, and as Deputy to General Varennikov who held a close personal relationship with Ahmad Shah Massoud, Liakhovskii also became a close personal friend of Massoud. In his 1995 and 2004 editions of Tragediya I Doblest Afgana, and Plamya Afgana, 1999, Liakhaovskii provides literally hundreds of references to Massoud and his willingness to work with the Soviet Contingent.  Of special interest and not generally known is the multiple references to the bifurcated Soviet policy towards Massoud.  As reiterated by Liakhovskii, who writes that on numerous occasions the DRA asked the Soviet Command to “smash Massoud”, citing Najibullah’s fear of the meteoric political and international ascendancy of Massoud.  But the unstated Soviet policy was to protect Massoud who was viewed as an asset by the Soviet High Command. Indeed, according to Liakhovskii, on several occasions when Najibullah would plan to launch an attack on the Panjshir redoubt, General Varennikov himself would tip-off Massoud to the impending operation, thereby facilitating his escape and sparing Massoud’s combat formations for deployment against other mujahideen groups, most notably, Hekmatyar’s  Hezb-i-Islami who, according to Liakhovskii, were the most effective anti-Soviet fighters.  Other little known facts revealed by Liakhovskii are that Moscow had considered Massoud as a replacement for the uninspired, phlegmatic and ineffectual Najibullah and that Ahmad Shah obsessed over reuniting co-ethnic Tajiks across the border in Soviet Central Asia with the Tajiks of Afghanistan in what he envisioned  a “Greater Tajikistan.”

Varrenikov said of Massoud that “he was pro-Russian, a friend that categorically forbade his formations from attacking Soviet troop formations, provided protection for supply columns en-route to Kabul, and moreover that he would be useful to Russia in the future and therefore in our best interest to retain him as a friend rather than an enemy.”  In his 2004 edition (Tragedy and Valor of the Afghantsy) Liakhovskii devotes 162 pages to this special Soviet relationship with Ahmad Shah Massoud.

In 2007, prolific military historian Alexandre Liakhovskii would write his final book, dedicating it to his close friend and colleague Ahmad Shah Massoud.  On 3 February 2009, A.A. Liakhovskii would pass away, succumbing to fatal coronary failure.

Liakhovskii’s final word on the Soviet/Afghan War was published in a limited “short-run” edition, distributed only through military and intelligence channels. The book, titled Grazhdanin, Politik, Voin: Pamiati Akmad Shakha Masuda, (‘Citizen, Politician, Fighter: In Memory of Shah Masoud’) features 350 pages and numerous photographs and documents.

Many will find it curious, telling, or perhaps ironic, that the mythical Nemesis (Massoud) of the Red Army would be so immortalized and honored in a book written by a Soviet general, an alleged enemy and general of an army for whom he was credited with defeating by the nihilist press.

In summation, General A.A. Liakhovskii’s narrative details what could be termed a mutual admiration societal relationship between Massoud and the Soviet High Command:

Quid-Pro-Quo:

In a this-for-that relationship, Soviet re-supply columns were beneficiaries of virtual security along Highway #2 thanks to Massoud’s  Quisling accommodations, and, as an added benefit for the Soviet prosecution of war, set the stage for enemy troops to re-deploy from Salang to other areas of Afghanistan as well. For Massoud, Soviet military and economic muscle would be the engine of political opportunity, power, finance, and to prepare the diplomatic arena for eventual Soviet annexation of the Northern areas of Afghanistan into the co-ethnic Central Asia Soviet Socialist Republics.

In support of the text, a sampling from the voluminous photo collection featured in this book is hereby presented in chronological order and with right to left orientation along with the captions translated into English.***

**Photo Captions:

#1: Defense Minister A.S. Masuda during his meeting with the Russian Representative, O.O. Aklinichiv.

#2: Masuda with Russian journalist V.N. Rosov.

#3: Z.A Aoshov, head of the Committee of ‘Internationalist Fighters of Commonwealth of Independent States’ (CIS) presents an award/gift to A.S. Masuda.

#4: One of the fellow fighters of A.S. Masuda, Major General Sharif Akram currently serving as Afghan Military Attaché to the Soviet General Staff.

#5: Ahmad Shah Masuda during his working visit meeting with Soviet high-ranking military officer, X.P. Smikov.

#6: At center, former bodyguard of Ahmad Shah Masuda Nikolai Bistrov while searching for information regarding Soviet soldiers MIA.

Note** Rendering of Ahmad Shah Massoud’s name as Masuda reflects Russian author’s usage and translation variables.

***Translation by Rahmat Arya.

Bruce G. Richardson

25. sep. 2009

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