Pashtuns, Extremism, Terrorism, and Foreign and Domestic Hands

The Pashtun nation has, throughout history, remained a living example of bravery, hospitality, the pursuit of freedom, and human dignity. The values of Pashtunwali, based on honor, loyalty, justice, and courage, have never aligned with the philosophy of extremism, fanaticism, rigidness, or terrorism. Yet today, when in many global media outlets Pashtuns are associated with violence, war, and terrorism, a profound, painful, and intellectual question arises: How did this change occur? How were Pashtuns pushed onto this dark and infamous path, and by whose hands?

The truth is that extremism, fanaticism, rigidness, and terrorism were not natural or inherent developments within Pashtun society. Instead, they were imposed, planned, and the product of decades-long political, strategic, and international manipulations. This process was not sudden; it developed gradually over decades, altering minds, distorting values, and rooting itself so deeply that undoing it has become extremely difficult.

In the late 20th century, when the Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union reached its peak, Afghanistan became a stage for this global competition. With the Soviet invasion, a massive armed proxy project began under the banner of jihad, with Pakistan playing a central role in this war according to its policies and strategic position. Millions of Afghan refugees came to Pakistan, mostly settling in Pashtun regions. Along with people, these refugees brought international proxy jihadist literature and harmful religious propaganda. Slowly, what began as a defensive concept of jihad transformed into an organized industrial and commercial process, with international powers aiming to train militants, build networks, form organizations, and cultivate a mindset steeped in fanaticism, extremism, rigidness, and terrorism.

During this period, Pakistan’s intelligence agencies took control of the organization, training, and funding of the Mujahideen. Groups aligned with the state’s strategic objectives received broad support. This policy gradually became a constant principle and practice. Armed religious groups began to be used as instruments of foreign policy. In Afghanistan, the Taliban were trained; in Kashmir, jihadist groups were fostered; and other armed groups were developed to apply regional pressure and control. All of this was carried out under the slogans of Islam, jihad, and brotherhood, but in reality, the aims were political, economic, and strategic.

The most dangerous aspect was that armed extremism was given legal, Islamic, moral, and political legitimacy. When a state presents an armed policy as sacred, this idea transcends society’s notions of right and wrong, taking on the garb of religion. From here, extremism, rigidness, fanaticism, and terrorism became not just political choices but sacred obligations.

Religious political parties also played a fundamental role in this process. Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam, through its madrasa system, became the main political representative of this agenda. Under its influence, thousands of madrasas were established, many of which turned into centers for spreading jihadist ideology. In these madrasas, the curriculum focused primarily on rigid jurisprudence, takfir, and jihadist literature, rather than modern sciences, philosophy, history, and human values. Students were trained in jihad and indoctrinated with extremist thought.

Alongside this, Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam also promoted a political version of ideological Islamism. Its intellectual school raised a generation that merged politics with rigid religious interpretation. They presented the idea of establishing an Islamic system, but this idea was largely associated with coercion, force, and the suppression of dissent. Both the party and the madrasa network organized propaganda campaigns, held rallies, issued fatwas, recruited volunteers, and gave social legitimacy to extremist, terrorist, and rigidly ideological thought.

Madrasas, once centers of religion, ethics, and spirituality, gradually became factories for producing extremist mindsets. Thousands of children were trained to see the world in binary terms of friend and enemy. These students were taught to view non-Muslims, sectarian opponents, and even differing Muslim thinkers with suspicion and hatred. Many madrasas lacked science, philosophy, critical thinking, modern knowledge, and education, focusing only on rote memorization, obedience, blind imitation, and proxy jihad training.

Simultaneously, a culture of weapons also strengthened in Pashtun areas. Weapons became a symbol of power, authority, honor, and influence. Local commanders, influential figures, and power brokers expanded their control under the guise of jihad. They armed young men in the name of honor, revenge, and religion, but in reality, these youths were used to serve personal political, economic, international, and empire-building interests.
Economic deprivation further exacerbated the danger. Poverty, unemployment, a weak education system, and continuous conflict left Pashtun youth hopeless about the future. When a young person has no access to education and is handed a weapon instead, when schools are closed but war centers are active and appealing, the outcome is predictable and it is the reality we witness today.

Despite all these truths, one crucial point must be clarified Pashtuns were not the architects of these processes. Pashtuns were the victims of these games. They were exploited for wars and international agendas, defamed, killed, and no one took accountability for their suffering.

Today, the most important question for Pashtuns is What is the path to escape these circumstances, and how? Often, Pashtuns look to force and weapons for change because their minds have been shaped by extremism. But this path does not lie in arms, it lies in the pen, in education, in intellectual freedom, in political awareness, economic self-reliance, and in deep reform of the madrasa curriculum. Until religious politics is cleansed of armed ideology, until Pashtun society regains its intellectual autonomy, and until opportunities for dignified living are provided to youth, escaping these conditions will remain difficult.

Extremism is not part of Pashtun identity. Terrorism is not part of Pashtun culture. A Pashtun is a poet, a lover, a man of pride, and a man of humanity. If Pashtuns recognize their true selves, this dark period will end, and the nation will once again stand before the world as a symbol of peace, honor, and enlightened thought.

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