The Counterproductive Logic of Coercion

The latest violation of the Afghan sovereignty by Pakistan and bombing mostly civilians underscores a dangerous trajectory in Afghanistan–Pakistan relations. Confirmed reports and widely circulated videos indicate that recent Pakistani airstrikes killed seventeen members of a single family, including women and children, at one strike location. The strikes come amid already severe bilateral strain: since late 2025, major crossings such as Torkham and Chaman have faced repeated disruptions, while more than one million Afghans have reportedly been expelled from Pakistan, deepening humanitarian and political tensions.

There is no doubt that incidents of this nature are strategically counterproductive. While Islamabad frames such actions as pre-emptive security measures, Kabul not only rejects Pakistan’s allegations but also accuses Islamabad of deflecting responsibility for its own obligations to stabilize the security environment. Actions of this kind inflame Afghan public anger, harden political positions on both sides of the Durand Line, and further constrict the already fragile space for de-escalation. At its core, the crisis reflects not a lack of pressure, but a fundamental mismatch in threat perceptions and political objectives between Kabul and Islamabad.

At the heart of this prolonged impasse lies a toxic convergence of colonial-era grievances, ethnic sensitivities, deep strategic mistrust, and ideological divergence, issues that neither side has yet demonstrated sufficient political will or strategic clarity to resolve. Pakistani officials, for their part, continue to argue that cross-Durand Line militant activity leaves them with limited operational choices. Yet despite decades of proxy-support policies, periodic airstrikes, and sustained economic pressure, Pakistan has failed to compel Afghanistan to accept the Durand Line either as a permanent international border or as the foundation of a predictable bilateral relationship.

The dispute is not merely cartographic; it cuts through shared Pashtun families and the unwritten social code of Pashtunwali. Successive Afghan governments since 1947, including the current IEA authorities, have questioned the line’s finality. At the same time, Afghanistan has historically refrained from operationalizing India-Pakistan rivalry against Pakistan, even during periods of open conflict between the two.

This raises a deeper strategic question: what does Pakistan ultimately seek in Afghanistan? a genuinely friendly government, or a structurally weak and predictable neighbour?
Islamabad has consistently blamed Afghanistan for security setbacks inside Pakistan. Yet this narrative sits uneasily alongside Pakistan’s own long and well-documented role in shaping Afghanistan’s instability over the past several decades. If Pakistan’s stated objective were simply the emergence of a friendly government in Kabul, it is difficult to argue that it could realistically expect a more ideologically sympathetic partner than the current Taliban-led Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan.

Though, Pakistani airstrikes inside Afghanistan, increasingly sharp rhetoric, persistent Durand Line frictions, recurring trade disruptions, and the steady erosion of mutual trust all point to a deeper structural problem, one that transcends the personality or ideological orientation of any single Afghan government.

For many observers, Pakistan’s security calculus has historically prioritized strategic predictability and limited Afghan assertiveness, particularly on the Durand Line, over the simple pursuit of political friendship in Kabul. Both sides therefore remain trapped in a cycle of constrained choices: each is blamed for failing to meet the other’s expectations, yet neither can act decisively without incurring significant costs.

The difference, however, lies in the nature of those constraints. Pakistan’s limits appear largely driven by strategic calculations, whereas Afghanistan’s hesitation seems more closely tied to ideological considerations. As so often in protracted rivalries, the real victims are ordinary civilians, especially women and children, caught between these structural pressures.

Afghanistan’s reluctance is interpreted in Islamabad as evidence of hostile intent. Yet this reading overlooks Pakistan’s own historical pattern of non-compliance, whether rooted in unwillingness or structural incapacity, when successive Afghan governments urged Islamabad to take the very measures it now demands of Kabul. Each side’s defensive posture thus appears offensive to the other, perpetuating a self-reinforcing cycle of accusation and retaliation.

There is no rapid or easy remedy. In the short term, carefully calibrated confidence-building measures remain the only realistic pathway to stabilization.  A joint verification mechanism, or phased and predictable reopening of key crossings, could begin to slow the current escalation cycle. Over the longer horizon, however, durable stability will almost certainly require a more fundamental political understanding, including a structured mechanism for managing the Durand Line dispute alongside credible, reciprocal security assurances from both Kabul and Islamabad.

Analysts widely maintain that Pakistan’s airstrikes inside Afghanistan, irrespective of official justifications and regardless of whatever state media may attempt to rationalize, cannot deliver lasting stability, consolidate peace, or eradicate terrorism and extremism. Until both sides accept that coercion cannot substitute for political understanding, the Durand Line will remain not a crossing point of stability, but a fault line of recurring crisis.

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