Afghanistan–Pakistan: Peaceful Coexistence

Afghanistan and Pakistan have never had a relationship free of political and geographical disagreements. Even before 1979, their governments held fundamentally different positions on important issues, including the status of the Durand Line. Yet these disagreements did not prevent a workable degree of interaction between the two countries. Almost unrestricted Cross-Durand Line movement, family and community relations, trade, cultural exchange, and other people-to-people connections continued despite political tensions.

The Soviet intervention in Afghanistan did not create the underlying differences between Afghanistan and Pakistan, nor did it mark the beginning of political competition between the two countries through Afghan actors. During the presidency of Mohammad Daoud Khan, relations had already become strained over Afghanistan’s political support for the Pashtunistan cause. Pakistan responded to this policy by providing military support and sanctuary to opponents of Daoud’s government. The Soviet intervention subsequently transformed the scale, moral values and character of the conflict, bringing Afghanistan into a much wider Cold War confrontation and further entrenching proxy warfare, armed conflict, migration, and security mistrust in relations between the two countries.

The experience of the past several decades demonstrates that disagreements do not necessarily make relations between neighbours unmanageable. The greater danger lies in allowing political disputes to become security confrontations and in using pressure, coercion, political interference, or armed proxies to pursue national objectives. Such policies can provide temporary leverage but ultimately deepen generate consequences that neither side can easily control.

Today, Afghanistan and Pakistan face a fundamental strategic reality: neither can choose its neighbour, and neither can secure its long-term interests through permanent confrontation with the other. At the same time, neither side appears prepared to set aside its position on the unresolved Durand Line geographical and territorial dispute. Their shared geography, historical and demographic ties, economic interactions, and security interests make prolonged hostility costly for both.

The realistic objective, therefore, should not be to demand that either country abandon its longstanding positions or to make the complete resolution of every dispute a precondition for normal relations. Afghanistan cannot be expected to surrender issues it considers fundamental, just as Pakistan cannot simply set aside its own concerns. What both countries must do, however, is move away from the use of proxy support as an instrument of state policy and instead establish a political relationship in which disagreement is accepted as a normal feature of interstate relations rather than treated as a justification for confrontation.

In my assessment, this requires a shift from seeking to influence or pressure the other country towards developing reliable mechanisms for managing differences. Regular consultations between the foreign ministries should be supported by specialized bilateral mechanisms dealing with security, trade, transit, humanitarian matters, and other areas of mutual concern. Security and civilian authorities should have direct channels through which incidents and allegations can be raised, information exchanged, and facts established before tensions escalate.

A credible crisis-management mechanism is particularly important. Neither government should be placed under pressure to respond immediately to an incident simply to demonstrate resolve. An agreed procedure for communication, verification, investigation, and consultation would create space for diplomacy before retaliatory measures are considered. Where direct negotiations cannot resolve a particular dispute, mutually agreed mediation, arbitration, or another peaceful mechanism should remain available.

Trade, transit, connectivity, humanitarian movement, and legitimate commercial activity should not repeatedly become instruments of political pressure. A dispute in one area should not be allowed to paralyse the entire relationship. This is particularly important because ordinary citizens, traders, transporters, workers, and businesses often bear the greatest cost of prolonged disruptions.

Afghanistan should continue diversifying its trade and transit routes and strengthening economic relations with other regional partners. Such diversification is a legitimate economic strategy rather than necessarily an act directed against Pakistan. Pakistan, meanwhile, has an economic interest in stable trade and transit with Afghanistan and in greater access to Central Asian markets. Connectivity should therefore be treated as an area of mutual opportunity rather than geopolitical leverage.

Track Two diplomacy and people-to-people relations can also help sustain communication during periods of political tension. Business leaders, scholars, journalists, community representatives, civil society actors, and other relevant stakeholders can maintain channels of dialogue when official relations become strained. Such engagement cannot substitute for formal state diplomacy, but it can preserve communication, build mutual understanding, and help prevent political disagreements between governments from turning into lasting hostility between the two societies.

Neither country’s security concerns should be dismissed. Pakistan has concerns about militant violence and threats emanating from Afghan territory, while Afghanistan has serious concerns regarding its sovereignty, proxy instrumentalization, military actions, and measures that affect its population and economy. Recognizing these concerns does not mean accepting every claim made by either side. It means creating a framework in which security concerns can be raised, examined, and addressed through established channels without automatically leading to escalation. The appropriate standard should be conduct: armed violence, interference in internal affairs, coercive pressure, and actions deliberately undermining the sovereignty or stability of the other state should be rejected regardless of which side undertakes them.

Ultimately, the two countries should accept that some historical, geographical, political, and security disputes may remain unresolved for a considerable period. Their continuation should not prevent cooperation in areas where their interests converge, nor should these disputes be allowed to poison the broader relationship. The objective should be to contain and manage disagreements rather than repeatedly allowing them to escalate into crises.

The historical narrative cannot simply be wished away. Decades of conflict, displacement, political interference, proxy warfare, and violence have left deep wounds in both societies. But allowing those grievances to dictate the future indefinitely would reproduce the same cycle for another generation.

Afghanistan and Pakistan do not need to agree on every contentious issue to pursue a more stable relationship. They need the political will to respect each other’s sovereignty, refrain from interference, address security concerns through established channels, maintain predictable economic relations, and manage crises before they escalate. For two neighbouring countries so deeply connected by geography and people, this is not merely a desirable aspiration; it is a practical necessity.