Manufactured Crises and Strategic Miscalculations

Afghanistan and Pakistan share deep-rooted cultural, religious, linguistic and economic ties and enjoyed decades of largely peaceful coexistence. However, as soon as Pakistan began pursuing its strategic-depth policy in Afghanistan, their relations increasingly deteriorated, becoming entangled in recurring cycles of political, security and commercial crises. Although these tensions are frequently attributed to terrorism, competing security perceptions and unresolved geographical disagreements, their persistence also reflects a deeper problem: the repeated use of political, security and economic instruments to manufacture or perpetuate crises rather than address their underlying causes.

One of the most consequential dimensions of this approach has been the use of militant groups as instruments of strategic influence. For decades, Afghanistan has experienced the destabilising consequences of policies based on perceived strategic interests and selective engagement with armed groups. Such approaches have contributed to prolonged instability, radicalisation and mutual insecurity. Rather than eliminating security threats, the instrumentalisation of militancy has helped create conditions in which insecurity becomes self-perpetuating. Sustainable regional security requires abandoning the selective use of militant organisations, addressing the roots of radicalisation and establishing reciprocal mechanisms for investigating and resolving security concerns.

A similar pattern is evident in the commercial dimension of bilateral relations, particularly through the repeated closure of the gates along the Durand Line. Pakistan’s geographical advantage and Afghanistan’s historical dependence on its trade and transit facilities have provided Islamabad with considerable economic leverage. An underlying assumption within sections of Pakistan’s strategic establishment has been that sufficiently sustained restrictions would eventually compel Afghanistan to accommodate its demands, leaving Kabul with little choice but to yield to its geographical and commercial dependence.

However, this calculation appears to have underestimated the strategic consequences of repeatedly using economic dependence as an instrument of political pressure. Instead of compelling the anticipated accommodation, Pakistan’s closures have accelerated Afghanistan’s efforts to diversify its trade and transit routes through Iran, Central Asia and other regional connections. What might otherwise have been a gradual economic diversification process has increasingly become a strategic necessity. Although Afghanistan has not eliminated its dependence on Pakistani routes, the development of alternatives is gradually reducing its vulnerability to unilateral disruptions.

The consequences extend beyond Afghanistan’s immediate commercial interests. Repeated closures undermine Pakistan’s reputation as a reliable transit partner, weaken commercial confidence and encourage traders and investors to establish alternative supply chains and regional partnerships. They also create a contradiction in Pakistan’s own regional ambitions: while seeking access to Central Asian markets through Afghanistan, Islamabad’s restrictions undermine the economic connectivity and mutual confidence necessary to achieve that objective. The more frequently geographical access is used as political leverage, the stronger Afghanistan’s incentive becomes to reduce its dependence on it. Thus, a policy intended to preserve strategic influence risks gradually eroding its foundations.

The implications are also political. Even the current Taliban led Afghan government that demonstrated considerable willingness to maintain close relations with Islamabad and accommodate its security concerns has been unable to establish dependable trade and transit arrangements. The demand for an international guarantee against unilateral closures of Durand Line gates illustrates how deeply confidence in ordinary bilateral commitments has deteriorated. When political goodwill cannot ensure predictable economic access, geographical proximity becomes a source of vulnerability rather than an advantage for regional cooperation.

Ultimately, the recurring use of political and security pressure, proxy politics and economic restrictions has weakened mutual confidence and imposed substantial costs on both societies. Pakistan’s geographical position gives it a significant transit and commercial advantage in relation to Afghanistan, but geographical advantage does not guarantee permanent strategic leverage. Its long-term value depends on the reliability, predictability and continuity of transit arrangements. By repeatedly using this advantage as an instrument of political pressure, Pakistan risks encouraging Afghanistan to diversify its trade and transit routes, develop alternative regional partnerships and reduce its dependence on Pakistani facilities. Consequently, measures intended to preserve influence could gradually undermine the very economic and geographical advantages on which that influence rests.

Moving beyond this cycle requires both countries to abandon coercive policies, proxy politics, the militarisation of diplomacy and the politicisation of trade. Security concerns should be addressed through direct dialogue, reciprocal security arrangements, credible verification mechanisms and mutual commitments to non-interference. Similarly, trade and transit should remain uninterrupted by political disagreements, allowing commercial connectivity to serve as a foundation for mutual confidence rather than an instrument of pressure. Neither country can achieve lasting security or regional prosperity by treating the other’s instability as a strategic instrument.

The era in which proxy politics and the exploitation of Afghanistan’s geographical vulnerabilities through Pakistan’s control over trade and transit routes could serve as effective instruments of political pressure should be considered over. Afghanistan is increasingly diversifying its regional economic connections, while the repeated use of transit restrictions has demonstrated the limitations and longer-term costs of such leverage. Both countries must recognise these changing realities and move towards a relationship based on sovereign equality, mutual respect, non-interference and reciprocal security commitments. Rather than perpetuating policies that deepen mistrust and undermine regional stability, they should pursue direct dialogue, predictable trade and transit arrangements and practical cooperation in the shared interests of their peoples and the wider region.