A Realistic Path for Two Difficult Neighbours

Pakistan has spent decades trying, without success, to shape a precarious Afghanistan according to its interests rather than learning to live with its neighbour in peaceful coexistence. Their relationship has been shaped by historical disputes, competing national identities, security concerns, political interference, armed groups, economic dependence, refugee movements, and recurring crises along the Durand Line. The deeper problem is not their disagreements, but the methods used to manage them, which often deepen mistrust and hinder reconciliation. Military pressure breeds resistance, political interference suspicion, proxy strategies retaliation, and economic restrictions diversification. The result is a cycle in which efforts to enhance security can ultimately undermine the stability both sides seek.

The relationship therefore needs to be understood beyond the immediate disputes of the day and without creating a false equivalence between the two sides. For several decades, Pakistan pursued a policy of cultivating and supporting Afghan militant and political proxies, seeking to shape Afghanistan’s internal political order and, at minimum, ensure that its foreign and security policy remained within Pakistan’s preferred strategic orbit. Afghanistan, meanwhile, developed its own legitimate security concerns arising from political interference, militant proxy warfare, cross-Durand Line attacks, and repeated attempts to influence its internal affairs.

The IEA’s current relationship with Pakistan has a distinct historical trajectory. During the Taliban’s prolonged insurgency against the United States and NATO invasion in Afghanistan, a deep ideological partnership developed between the Afghan Taliban and militant networks in Pakistan that shared their religious outlook and were closely influenced by Pakistan’s security establishment. The ideological affinity went far beyond a temporary strategic convergence. It was reinforced by shared religious narratives, social and organizational links, mutual support networks, and a common struggle against the U.S. and NATO presence in Afghanistan.

Pakistan’s fundamental dilemma today is partly a consequence of its own earlier policies. The actors it once sought to influence have evolved into an autonomous political force that cooperates where interests converge but resists subordination to Pakistan’s priorities. Meanwhile, the IEA’s refusal or inability to address Pakistan’s concerns over militant activity has created a challenge, potentially greater than, the one Pakistan itself struggled to contain for decades. The present confrontation reflects decades of intervention, proxy politics, ideological affinity, evolving national interests, and the failure of both sides to establish a mutually acceptable framework for security and coexistence.

Indeed, Pakistan’s own history with the Taliban demonstrates how quickly such strategic partnerships can change when underlying interests shift. Pakistan maintained close relations with the Taliban’s first government, but effectively abandoned that partnership after September 11, 2001, when its strategic priorities changed. Afghanistan, however, was invaded and subjected to prolonged war partly because the Taliban refusedor to sever their ideological ties with al-Qaeda, highlighting the limits of assuming that ideological affinity necessarily translates into enduring strategic alignment.

A major and unacceptable obstacle in the relationship is Pakistan’s security establishment’s failure to view Afghanistan as an equal and sovereign partner. It has often treated political and security developments inside Afghanistan primarily as matters of Pakistan’s strategic security, rather than as issues belonging to a sovereign neighbouring state. Afghanistan, in turn, has frequently interpreted Pakistani policies as attempts to influence or shape its political choices and internal affairs. This has produced a deeply asymmetrical relationship in which developments inside Afghanistan are routinely assessed through the security lens of Pakistan’s establishment. The result is an unusually high level of strategic mistrust between two states that remain geographically, economically, culturally and historically interconnected.

The armed-groups question is a particularly important example. Afghanistan has for decades accused elements within Pakistan of providing sanctuary, support or political space to groups fighting successive Afghan governments. Pakistan likewise Afghanistan today, has similarly rejected or contested these allegations. Pakistan, in turn, has been accusing Afghanistan of allowing anti-Pakistan militants to operate from Afghan territory, allegations that Afghan authorities have also rejected or disputed. An independent analysis should not begin by deciding that one narrative is automatically credible and the other is automatically political. The important point is that both countries have experienced armed violence connected to the territory, institutions or political environment of the other, and both have used those experiences to justify policies that the other regards as hostile. This reciprocal pattern has to be addressed if the security problem is ever to be reduced.

There is a fundamental contradiction in Pakistan’s traditional approach: it seeks a stable Afghanistan free of threats, yet its attempts to influence Afghanistan’s internal politics have contributed significantly to instability and mistrust. Afghanistan, meanwhile, should not replicate Pakistan’s historical approach toward its neighbour and must make sincere efforts to address Pakistan’s legitimate security concerns. Neither country can achieve lasting security simply by demanding that the other change its behaviour; both must acknowledge and address how their own policies and actions contribute to insecurity.

What is needed is not another round of statements but a permanent bilateral architecture for managing disagreement. This should include crisis-management channels linking political, security, intelligence, mutually agrees Durand Line -management and economic authorities. Incidents should trigger consultation, evidence-sharing and investigation before retaliation. Security commitments must be reciprocal: Afghanistan and Pakistan should commit not to use their territories, institutions or influence against each other.

The Durand Line dispute should be managed separately from practical cooperation. Both sides can retain their political positions while maintaining predictable arrangements for Durand Line crossings, trade, movement and local communities. Similarly, economic relations should move from dependence to interdependence. Afghanistan’s alternative routes are legitimate, as are Pakistan’s efforts to expand regional connectivity. Neither should use economic dependence as permanent leverage.

Ultimately, Pakistan must accept that an independent Afghan foreign policy is not automatically an Indian project to threaten Pakistan’s security as Afghanistan, has historically never exploited India-Pakistan rivalry. Neither country can permanently control the other, and geography makes coexistence unavoidable. Regional actors such as China, Iran and the Central Asian states can facilitate dialogue, but they cannot manufacture trust. The essential shift must come from Kabul and Islamabad: from leverage and retaliation to sovereign equality, reciprocal security, predictable trade and managed disagreement.

A successful relationship would not require friendship or agreement on every historical dispute. It would require predictability and institutional mechanisms for managing disagreements: security incidents should lead to investigation rather than immediate retaliation; there should be a bilateral mechanism for managing crossings along the Durand Line; refugees should not be used as instruments of political pressure; and trade should not be held hostage to diplomatic disputes.

A sustainable bilateral framework requires issue-specific institutional mechanisms under diplomatic oversight. Security, trade, refugee affairs, transit, and other matters should be negotiated through their respective channels and managed independently, so that disagreements in one domain do not obstruct cooperation in others. The real choice is therefore not between friendship and hostility, but between continued confrontation and a structured coexistence based on mutual interests. That is the only realistic path toward stability, prosperity and dignity for two difficult neighbours.

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