Pakistan’s Security-First Approach: Negotiation or Precondition?

Pakistan’s insistence on concrete and verifiable security measures is understandable as a negotiating objective, but the difficulty arises when such measures are treated as a precondition for dialogue rather than an outcome of dialogue. If the purpose of negotiations is to resolve a security dispute, then security concerns must be discussed within the negotiating process.

The parties need to identify the sources of insecurity, examine competing allegations, agree on responsibilities and establish mechanisms through which commitments can be verified. Expecting one side to provide the desired security outcome before substantive negotiations begin risks turning negotiation into a demand for compliance, leaving little room to address the underlying causes of insecurity.

A durable security arrangement cannot be produced simply by demanding that the other side act differently. If Pakistan considers armed groups operating from Afghan territory a major source of insecurity, that concern should be placed at the center of negotiations. But Afghanistan’s concerns, including military strikes, civilian harm, cross-Durand Line operations, restrictions on trade and movement, and other actions that Kabul regards as sources of insecurity, also form part of the security environment. Ignoring such concerns does not eliminate them; it leaves important drivers of confrontation outside the negotiating framework.

The central weakness of  security-first approach is therefore the assumption that insecurity has only one direction of causation. Security between neighbouring states is difficult to get sustainable when one side defines its own insecurity exclusively through the actions of the other while treating its own airstrikes defensive measures only. Even where particular security allegations are substantiated, negotiations are necessary precisely because the parties disagree over responsibility, proportionality, evidence and appropriate responses.

This is why concrete and verifiable security commitments should be the outcome of a negotiated mechanism rather than a condition for entering one. The two sides must negotiate reciprocal commitments covering prevention of attacks from their respective territories, intelligence and evidence sharing, investigation of disputed incidents, restrictions on armed groups, mechanisms for addressing alleged violations, protection of civilians and procedures for resolving crises before they escalate into military confrontation.

Such an approach would also address what might be described as self-generated insecurity. Military pressure, economic restrictions, prolonged closure of crossing points, and the absence of predictable channels for resolving disputes can themselves generate tensions and make existing security problems harder to manage. Recognizing this does not dismiss Pakistan’s security concerns; rather, it places them within a broader cause-and-effect relationship in which the actions of both states can either reduce insecurity or contribute to its reproduction.

If Pakistan remains fixed on obtaining security guarantees from Afghanistan while ignoring its own share of responsibility before engaging in substantive negotiations, it risks becoming trapped in a cycle in which the conditions for dialogue are never fully met and the underlying security concerns therefore remain unresolved. That would work against Pakistan’s own interests. Without a functioning mechanism for direct engagement, evidence-sharing, joint investigation and reciprocal commitments, allegations will continue to be addressed through unilateral measures rather than negotiated solutions. Over time, this can deepen mistrust, reduce Pakistan’s ability to secure cooperation from Kabul, and make the management of cross-border security threats more difficult. The issue, therefore, is not simply whether Pakistan can sustain its present position, but whether that position can actually deliver the security cooperation it seeks.

Pakistan has legitimate grounds to raise its security concerns with Afghanistan. The difficulty arises when those concerns become a prerequisite for substantive negotiations, because the disputed issues are then excluded from the process meant to resolve them. Given the history of the two countries’ security policies and the realities on the ground, a more workable approach would be to negotiate security commitments within a reciprocal framework.

Both sides would address threats originating from their respective territories, share relevant evidence, investigate disputed incidents, protect civilians, and establish procedures for preventing and managing crises. This would not require Pakistan to set aside its security concerns; rather, it would provide a structured mechanism to address, verify and enforce them. Security, therefore, should not be a precondition for dialogue; it should be the principal objective and measurable outcome of dialogue.

Pakistan’s security-first approach is understandable given the threats it faces, but the fundamental issue is how security is to be achieved. If Islamabad expects Afghanistan to provide concrete and verifiable security assurances, Afghanistan can reasonably expect Pakistan to address the security concerns generated by its own policies and actions, including its historical pursuit of strategic depth, and provide assurances that such a policy will no longer be pursued. A more sustainable approach would therefore be to negotiate security commitments within a reciprocal framework in which both sides identify threats, share relevant evidence, investigate disputed incidents, protect civilians and establish verifiable commitments for preventing and managing crises. Security should not be a precondition for dialogue; it should be the principal objective and measurable outcome of the negotiations.

History Cannot Be Wished Away or Allowed to Dictate the Future