Prospects for the U.S.–Gulf Strategic Partnership

Yemen and the Red Sea: Prospects for the U.S.–Gulf Strategic Partnership

 

The conflict in Yemen has evolved beyond an internal struggle. It now affects Gulf security, freedom of navigation in the Red Sea, energy markets, and broader international interests. As fighting between the Houthis and Saudi-backed Yemeni forces continues, and as threats extend to Saudi territory and commercial shipping routes, the U.S.–Gulf partnership faces the challenge of preserving regional stability without allowing the conflict to escalate into a broader war.

In this context, Sheikh Hamad bin Jassim bin Jaber Al Thani, Qatar’s former prime minister and foreign minister, expressed concern about the threats facing Saudi Arabia. He called on the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states to overcome their differences and provide the Kingdom with practical support. He also argued that threats originating in Yemen may reflect strategic calculations extending beyond Yemen’s borders and that statements of solidarity alone are insufficient. His remarks underscore the need for coordinated Gulf security measures alongside sustained diplomatic engagement.

Saudi Security and Gulf Stability

Saudi Arabia’s security is central to Gulf stability because of its political and economic influence, its role in global energy markets, and its importance to international trade. Attacks on Saudi territory or critical infrastructure can undermine investor confidence, disrupt air traffic, affect energy markets, and increase risks to commercial shipping.

The first priority of U.S.–Gulf cooperation should therefore be defensive. This includes integrated air and missile defense, early-warning systems, intelligence sharing, cybersecurity, protection of energy facilities, and emergency planning for attacks on civilian infrastructure. These measures should protect territory and populations without expanding the war inside Yemen.

Gulf unity does not require every state to endorse the same military policy. It does, however, require agreement on several basic principles: Saudi Arabia must be protected, attacks on civilians must be rejected, international navigation must remain open, and the conflict must not be allowed to spread. Washington can assist by improving interoperability among Gulf partners, coordinating defensive deployments, and establishing procedures for rapid consultation during a crisis.

The Red Sea and International Trade

Yemen’s location near the Bab al-Mandab Strait gives the conflict consequences far beyond the country’s borders. The strait connects the Red Sea with the Gulf of Aden and forms a major maritime route linking Asian, European, and Middle Eastern markets. Threats to commercial vessels can raise insurance costs, disrupt supply chains, and force ships to take longer and more expensive routes.

Protecting maritime traffic is both a defensive responsibility and an international security mission. It may involve surveillance, intelligence sharing, convoy coordination, mine detection, vessel protection, and cooperation with international naval forces. These activities should be clearly distinguished from offensive operations aimed at degrading Houthi positions inside Yemen.

Maritime protection can reduce immediate risks, but it cannot resolve the underlying political conflict. Securing shipping routes requires both operational safeguards and diplomatic efforts to prevent Yemen from becoming a permanent source of regional instability.

Four Distinct Instruments of Strategy

A coherent U.S.–Gulf policy should distinguish among four related but separate instruments.

Defensive cooperation protects territory, infrastructure, populations, and maritime traffic. It includes air defense, intelligence sharing, cybersecurity, civil defense, and the protection of commercial vessels. Its purpose is to reduce vulnerability and limit damage.

Offensive military action uses force to strike or degrade an adversary’s military capabilities. Such action may be considered in response to an imminent or continuing threat, but it carries a greater risk of escalation. Any offensive operation should have a defined legal basis, limited objectives, robust civilian-protection measures, and a clear plan for termination. It should not become an open-ended substitute for diplomacy.

Deterrence seeks to prevent attacks by making their expected costs clear and credible. It can include defensive resilience, public warnings, diplomatic consequences, sanctions, interdiction of weapons transfers, and, when necessary, the demonstrated ability to respond. Deterrence is successful when it prevents escalation; it should not be confused with retaliation for its own sake.

Diplomatic engagement addresses the political conditions that sustain the conflict. It includes negotiations, back-channel communication, mediation, confidence-building measures, prisoner exchanges, humanitarian arrangements, and support for a Yemeni political process. Diplomacy is not a sign of weakness. It is the instrument most capable of converting a temporary reduction in violence into a durable settlement.

Washington’s Role

The United States should organize its policy around these distinctions. Its immediate responsibility is to help Saudi Arabia and other Gulf partners defend their territory and critical infrastructure. This requires reliable intelligence, integrated air and missile defense, maritime awareness, and joint planning.

Deterrence should reinforce these defensive measures. Washington must communicate that attacks on Saudi territory, civilian infrastructure, or international shipping will produce serious consequences. At the same time, deterrent messages should be precise enough to avoid unnecessary ambiguity or an uncontrolled cycle of retaliation.

Offensive military action should remain limited and exceptional. Strikes may weaken an adversary’s ability to launch attacks, but they cannot, by themselves, eliminate the Houthis’ political influence or create a unified Yemeni government. Military force should therefore be tied to specific objectives and reviewed regularly. The United States should avoid commitments that lack a defined end state or that make diplomacy more difficult.

Diplomatic engagement should proceed in parallel with security measures. Washington can work with Saudi Arabia, the United Nations, Oman, other regional actors, and Yemeni parties to establish channels for de-escalation. The goal should be to link reductions in attacks to reciprocal and verifiable steps, rather than treating military pressure as a substitute for negotiations.

Iran, the Houthis, and Regional Containment

Iranian support for the Houthis remains an important element of the regional security environment. Weapons transfers, technical assistance, and political backing can increase the Houthis’ ability to threaten Saudi Arabia and maritime traffic. Measures to disrupt such support may therefore contribute to deterrence and defense.

Yet the conflict cannot be explained solely through the relationship between Tehran and the Houthis. The movement has local roots, domestic political objectives, and its own military calculations. Pressure on Iran may reduce external support, but it will not, by itself, resolve Yemen’s internal divisions.

The U.S. approach should consequently combine targeted pressure on external military assistance with defensive protection, calibrated deterrence, and diplomatic engagement with relevant parties. The objective should be containment: preventing Yemen from serving as a platform for attacks on neighboring states or international shipping while creating conditions for a political settlement.

Gulf Partnerships and Political Settlement

Saudi Arabia’s defense relationships with countries such as Pakistan and Türkiye can strengthen regional resilience and distribute security responsibilities. Their roles should be defined carefully. Cooperation in training, intelligence, air defense, maritime security, and logistics is distinct from participation in offensive operations inside Yemen.

Clear mandates are essential. Gulf and partner states should understand which activities are defensive, which are intended to deter attacks, and which if any would involve offensive force. This clarity can reduce miscalculation and prevent a defensive coalition from being perceived as a mechanism for widening the war.

Security cooperation must also support diplomacy. The United States, Saudi Arabia, the United Nations, and regional partners should encourage a Yemeni process that protects civilians, addresses political representation, and establishes verifiable security guarantees. A sustainable truce requires monitoring, reciprocal commitments, and mechanisms for resolving violations. Without these elements, a ceasefire may merely postpone renewed fighting.

Conclusion

The crises in Yemen and the Red Sea require a U.S.–Gulf strategy that distinguishes among defense, deterrence, offensive force, and diplomacy while coordinating them toward a common objective.

Defensive cooperation should protect Saudi Arabia, Gulf states, civilians, and international shipping. Deterrence should prevent further attacks by making the consequences of escalation credible. Offensive military action, if undertaken, should be limited, lawful, and tied to specific objectives rather than an open-ended campaign. Diplomatic engagement should address the political causes of the conflict and provide a path toward a durable settlement.

The strategic opportunity is to transform Gulf solidarity into disciplined cooperation. Regional stability will depend not only on military capability, but also on restraint, clear communication, shared responsibilities, and sustained diplomacy.

The original article was published on the White House platform in Washington, D.C.

Dr.Ubaidullah Burhani
Academic and Political Writer, Afghan-American

October 14, 2026

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