Blaming India, Blaming Afghanistan, Avoiding Itself: Pakistan’s Old Game

For decades, Pakistan has positioned itself as a moral commentator on regional conflicts. It has lectured India on Kashmir, condemned human rights abuses across the Line of Control, demanded international investigations, and insisted that political grievances cannot be crushed through military force. It has portrayed itself as a responsible regional stakeholder, even seeking diplomatic relevance during crises such as the recent Iran conflict by projecting itself as a stabilizing voice.

Yet today, Pakistan finds itself trapped by a profound irony of its own making.

The standards it has demanded of others are the very standards it is increasingly accused of violating at home.

As allegations mount that security forces fired on protesters in Pakistan-administered Kashmir, communications were restricted, activists detained, and political dissent treated as a security threat, Islamabad’s long-standing rhetoric rings increasingly hollow. For years Pakistan argued that Kashmiris deserved political representation, accountability, and freedom from excessive force. Today, many protesters in the territory under Pakistan’s own administration say they are demanding precisely those same principles.

This is not merely a public relations problem. It is a crisis of credibility.

Every statement Pakistan has made for decades criticizing India’s administration of Kashmir now invites an uncomfortable question: if political grievances deserve dialogue across the Line of Control, why are similar grievances at home increasingly met with coercion rather than reform?

The contradiction is impossible to ignore.

When unrest erupts, Islamabad’s response has become remarkably predictable. Protesters are accused of serving foreign interests. Critics are portrayed as instruments of hostile intelligence agencies. Domestic failures are reframed as externally manufactured conspiracies. India becomes the explanation, even when citizens are protesting over elections, governance, economic hardship, or political representation.

External interference is always possible in geopolitics. No serious analyst dismisses that possibility. But governments that reflexively blame foreign hands for every internal crisis often reveal less about their enemies than about their unwillingness to confront their own shortcomings.

Pakistan’s leadership appears increasingly comfortable explaining every symptom while refusing to diagnose the disease.

The same pattern is visible along the Afghan border.

For years Islamabad has demanded that Afghanistan eliminate sanctuaries used by the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan. There is legitimate concern about cross-border militancy, and no state should be expected to tolerate attacks launched from neighboring territory. But blaming Kabul has become a substitute for asking harder questions about why militant organizations continue to regenerate despite years of military campaigns, intelligence operations, and counterterrorism offensives.

Pakistan has become trapped in a cycle of externalizing responsibility.

When terrorism rises, Afghanistan is blamed.

When protests erupt, India is blamed.

When separatist violence expands, foreign intelligence services are blamed.

Meanwhile, the underlying drivers poor governance, political exclusion, economic marginalization, weak local institutions, and declining public trust—remain stubbornly unresolved.

This is not strategy. It is avoidance.

The security establishment has perfected the language of kinetic operations while neglecting the language of political legitimacy. Every crisis is viewed through a military lens. Every challenge becomes a security threat. Every critic becomes suspect. Every protest becomes a conspiracy.

The result is a state that can deploy force rapidly but struggles to generate lasting political consent.

Nowhere is this failure more evident than in Balochistan. Decades of militarization have not extinguished the insurgency. Instead, attacks on security personnel and strategic infrastructure continue, demonstrating that force alone cannot resolve disputes rooted in governance, representation, and perceptions of unequal development. Military superiority has not translated into political stability.

Nor has Pakistan’s pursuit of international diplomatic relevance compensated for these domestic shortcomings.

A government that seeks recognition abroad while facing simultaneous crises in Kashmir, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, and Balochistan risks appearing more concerned with managing its international image than repairing its domestic foundations. Diplomatic activism cannot substitute for political legitimacy at home.

The uncomfortable reality is that Pakistan’s greatest strategic vulnerability is no longer simply India, Afghanistan, or any foreign adversary. It is the widening gap between the state’s official narrative and the lived experiences of many of its own citizens.

History is unforgiving to governments that mistake criticism for conspiracy and coercion for stability.

Pakistan has spent decades arguing that military control cannot resolve the Kashmir dispute. If that principle is valid when directed at others, it must also be valid when applied to itself.

Credibility in international affairs is not built on speeches, diplomatic initiatives, or accusations against neighbors. It is built on consistency.

And consistency is precisely what Pakistan’s leadership appears to be losing.

Pakistan’s Crypto Diplomacy and the Anatomy of a Failing State

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