General Asim Munir should seek answers in the origins and history of Pakistan

 Rather than making dehumanizing remarks about Afghan lives, General Asim Munir should seek answers in the origins and history of Pakistan

The Pakistani media has cited the country’s chief of army staff, Syed Asim Munir, who, by intertwining the pressing issue of the insurgency in Balochistan with its challenges related to Islamic Jihadi groups, has accused Afghanistan of supporting the insurgency in Pakistan. Munir also asserted that Afghanistan has never demonstrated friendship towards Pakistan, emphasizing, “The life of a single Pakistani is more important than the entire Afghanistan.” Despite this, political analysts argue that Pakistani officials are trying to conceal their security weaknesses by leveling accusations against Afghanistan. Moreover, many observers in the region, and globally question the dehumanizing statement that equates the lives of the entire Afghan population to that of a single Pakistani.

The peculiar turn of events is noteworthy, considering that for decades, Pakistan faced accusations of harboring Islamic extremist terrorism. Now, however, it is Pakistan that is making such accusations.

In Pakistan, a prevalent narrative asserts that the country’s facilitation of US support for the Afghan Mujahidin in the 1980s laid the foundation for current Islamic extremism and terrorism in the region. However, the flaw in this narrative lies in its failure to acknowledge that the US did not approach Pakistan with a plan to utilize these Islamic extremists against the Soviet Union. The reality is that Pakistan has been leveraging Islamic fervor and Jihad since its inception in 1947. By the time the Soviets invaded Afghanistan in 1979, Pakistan had already organized, trained, and utilized Islamic extremist groups to destabilize Afghanistan during President Daud’s tenure in the 1970s.

The crux of the matter is not Islam itself; rather, it centers on Pakistan’s misuse of Islam since its inception. Now, facing consequences, Pakistan is pointing fingers at others, including Afghanistan.

In an interview in 1981, General Zia Ul Haq, who served as Pakistan’s military ruler in the 1980s, expressed, “Pakistan is like Israel, an ideological state. Take out the Judaism from Israel and it will fall like a house of cards. Take Islam out of Pakistan and make it a secular state; it would collapse.” The significance of Islam in the genesis and national narrative of Pakistan is essential for comprehending the country’s perplexed identity, its ongoing crisis with the Islamic insurgency, and its future outlooks.

The British initially contemplated the creation of Pakistan within the framework of Cold War real-politics. Faced with the inability to rely on India’s dominant Congress party, led by Nehru, which had demonstrated independence and anti-colonialist stances, the departing British Power resorted to a well-established strategy of creating division. This approach aimed to weaken India through the manipulation of the idea of Pakistan and eventually establishing the state of Pakistan to safeguard British strategic interests in the region. The partition served the purpose of preventing the spread of Communism throughout the entire region of India and the oil-rich Middle East. By designating Pakistan as a separate Muslim state, it was intended to act as a buffer state, thwarting the spread of Communism in the region.

From the inception of the Pakistan movement, Islamic groups have been actively encouraged and employed for various purposes. These groups were utilized to garner support for the concept of Pakistan on certain occasions, employed to suppress ethnic identities at other times, and used to execute Pakistan’s foreign policy in the region on yet another front. The consistent promotion of Islamic identity and the simultaneous suppression of ethnic identity have set Pakistan on a historical trajectory that seems to be its vulnerable point, akin to an Achilles’ heel.

Creating a new nation, especially by delineating it from contested territories within a region rich in history, cultures, religions, and shared experiences developed over centuries, necessitated a cohesive national narrative. This narrative was crucial to justify the existence of this artificially created entity and the separation of ethnic groups from their kin. Islam emerged as the chosen adhesive to bind the new country of Pakistan together and simultaneously function as the tool to keep ethnic groups within this freshly established nation disconnected from their counterparts across borders, from whom they were recently separated.

The process of carving out Pakistan, coupled with ethnic suppression, proxy wars, and conflicts with neighboring nations, has not only strengthened the Islamic narrative but, more significantly, bolstered the influence of Islamic groups and their network of madrassas in Pakistan.

Historical evidence reveals that it was secular figures like Jinnah and Iqbal who deliberately harnessed the influence of extremist Muslims in the Indian subcontinent to advocate for the creation of Pakistan. However, the utilization of extremist groups did not conclude with this. During Jinnah’s era, the fervor of Jihad was deliberately employed to mobilize tribal forces for the assault on Kashmir in 1947. Even the secular General Yahaya Khan, known for his penchant for whisky, utilized Islamic groups to suppress and perpetrate genocide in Bangladesh. In the 1970s, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, an educated leader from Berkeley and Oxford, incorporated the nebulous Islamic concept of Pakistan into the official identity of the nation.

Bhutto introduced a set of Islamic reforms during his tenure, including prohibitions on alcoholic drinks, gambling, horse-racing, and dance- and nightclubs. While these Islamic measures were auxiliary to the core of his socioeconomic policies, they significantly influenced subsequent Islamic development. Bhutto’s incorporation of extensive Islamic provisions in the 1973 constitution and the declaration of Ahmadis as non-Muslims heightened the expectations of religious parties and laid the groundwork for intensified religious activities.

The rise of Islamic groups in Pakistan was an inevitable outcome of the indistinct concept of Pakistan. The suppression of the ethnic Bengalis in East Pakistan, followed by their subsequent uprising, declaration of independence, and the formation of Bangladesh, marked the commencement of an unavoidable downward trajectory. The humiliating defeat and surrender of the 93-thousand-strong Pakistan Army to the Indian Army in 1971, a consequence of the Bengali ethnic revolt, the opposition from the old pre-Pakistan Pashtun ethnic group to the creation of Pakistan, the ethnic insurgency in Baluchistan, the ongoing Kashmir dispute, and the general mistrust and both real and perceived threats from India and Afghanistan all played pivotal roles. These factors influenced even the secular, Berkley-Oxford educated Bhutto to enact significant legislations formalizing Islam in Pakistan and empowering Islamic groups. This trend was later institutionalized by Pakistan’s Islamist military ruler, General Zia Ul Haq.

Documented evidence indicates that the Pakistani establishment, particularly the Army and ISI, presented Islamic extremist groups and the concept of Jihad to the United States as an alternative in their objective to oppose the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. The issue arises from Pakistan consistently framing this use and reliance on Islamic extremist groups and Jihad as a joint venture between Pakistan and the US. In a discussion with the Carnegie Endowment on October 26, 2012, General Pervez Musharraf described this narrative, stating that the United States and Pakistan “both decided to fight for Afghan independence by launching a jihad, or holy war, that would have support from across the Muslim world.” While it is acknowledged that the United States initiated operations to arm and fund resistance against the Soviet occupation, shifting the blame from Pakistan, which has historically utilized Islamic extremism and Jihad for its geopolitical objectives and presented these groups to the United States, is a clever political maneuver by the Pakistani establishment.

Since the late 1990s, Pakistan has confronted terrorism from various groups, stemming from local veterans of the U.S.-supported mujahideen in Afghanistan who redirected their focus to domestic issues. The government’s strategy has involved collaborating with certain jihadists while rejecting others. Although Pakistani officials differentiate among different categories of jihadis, the militants do not always share the same perspective. Despite disagreements over theological nuances and the vision of an ideal Islamic state, these groups operate within a cooperative ecosystem. Individuals frequently transition between groups, and groups undergo transformations and mutations, yet their commitment to jihad remains steadfast.

For years, Pakistan’s military leaders have pledged a robust counterterrorism plan targeting all violent extremist groups indiscriminately, but its implementation is still pending. Without such implementation, new factions and splinter groups from existing jihadi movements will continue to emerge, each with variations in emphasis and targets. Consequently, attacks like the recent one will persist at regular intervals.

In conclusion, the complex tapestry of Pakistan’s history, geopolitics, and internal dynamics reflects a nation grappling with its identity and the consequences of its historical choices. The recent accusations against Afghanistan, juxtaposed with Pakistan’s own history of facing allegations related to Islamic extremism, highlight the intricate interplay of regional geopolitics and internal struggles.

The inception of Pakistan itself, a product of Cold War real-politics and British strategic maneuvering, set the stage for the utilization of Islamic identity as a cohesive force. However, this has also become a double-edged sword, leading to a slippery slope marked by ethnic suppression, proxy wars, and the rise of Islamic groups.

The shifting blame for the rise of Islamic extremism in the region, from Pakistan’s historical use of these elements for geopolitical objectives to a supposed joint venture with the United States during the Afghan conflict, showcases the intricacies of political narratives. While the accusations persist, the reality remains that Pakistan is confronting the consequences of its historical choices and is now grappling with internal security challenges.

The ongoing struggle against terrorism, coupled with the challenges posed by various extremist groups, underscores the need for a comprehensive counterterrorism plan in Pakistan. The emergence of new factions and the persistence of attacks highlight the urgency of implementing effective measures to address the root causes of extremism within the country.

As Pakistan navigates its path forward, it faces the daunting task of reconciling its historical legacy, geopolitical realities, and the imperative to foster a secure and stable future. The intricate relationship between religion, identity, and governance will continue to shape Pakistan’s trajectory, making it imperative for the nation to navigate these complexities judiciously for a more harmonious and secure future.